Preparedness and comprehensive security - Committee report by Prime Minister’s Office
Preparedness and 
comprehensive security
Committee report
Prime Minister’s Office Publications     18/2011

Preparedness and 
comprehensive security
Committee report
Prime Minister’s Office Publications | 18/2011

Publisher
PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE
DESCRIPTION
2 November 2011
Type of publication
Publication
Commissioned by
Prime Minister’s Office
Name of publication
Preparedness and comprehensive security. Committee report
Abstract
The committee responsible for this report was set up to prepare a comprehensive report on preparedness in 
society. The work was based on proposals presented in 2009 in the Government Security and Defence Policy 
Report which called for a reassessment of the present comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for 
Securing the Functions Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their content, arrangements, 
lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation.
Finland’s preparedness arrangements are in no need of major reform. As the operating environment and 
threat scenarios change,  preparedness must be based on the broadest security thinking possible, that of 
comprehensive security, and on harnessing the resources of the whole of society. In preparedness, better 
account should be taken of the stronger role played by the business sector and the significance of non-
governmental organisations. Further steps are also necessary to increase co-operation as the reform of the 
state regional administration and municipalities continue.
The committee aims at eliminating overlaps in operations and improving co-operation. Confidence increases if 
normal statutory powers are maintained in preparedness and the management of disruptions. Attention is paid 
by the committee to the development of situation awareness and opportunities to obtain correct, immediate 
information serving preparedness. 
The committee emphasises the principles of representative democracy and considers the reporting procedure 
an essential instrument to laying down Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines. It is necessary to set  a 
goal-oriented schedule for the preparation of reports. The Government Report on Security and Defence Policy 
be complemented with a new report of narrower or broader scope, depending on the situation. Adoption of a 
comprehensive approach to security entails extending the scope of the reports to include the examination of 
new types of security issues. 
The committee proposes that the operating preconditions of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy should be strengthened, while recognising the importance of joint meetings between this Cabinet 
Committee and the President of the Republic. The Minister of the Interior should also become a member of the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The committee also proposes that the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy should organise open seminars on comprehensive security.
The Security and Defence Committee should be renamed as the Security Committee and be strengthened by 
broadening its base. The preparation of security affairs should be developed by strengthening the status of the 
Security Secretariat, under the Security Committee. The committee sees no need to establish a separate security 
council.
Close cooperation, in line with the committee’s proposals, between the authorities, the business sector, non-
governmental organisations and individual citizens bolsters collective responsibility.  
Keywords
Preparedness, comprehensive security, Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, Security Committee, 
Security Secretariat 
Name of series and number of publication
Prime Minister’s Office Publications 18/2011
Language
En
Number of pages
96
ISBN (print)
–
ISBN (PDF)
978-952-5896-77-0
ISSN
1799-7828
Publisher
Prime Minister’s Office
Publication as a PDF: www.vnk.fi/english
Further information: julkaisut@vnk.fi
Distribution and sales
–
Layout
Prime Minister’s Office, Anja Järvinen
Confidentiality rating
Public
Printed by 
–

5CONTENTS
TO THE GOVERNMENT ....................................................................................................... 7
ABSTRACT  ........................................................................................................................ 9
PART I:   FINNISH SOCIETY’S STRENGTHS AND PREPAREDNESS ...................................... 11
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 11
2 The committee’s assignment and work ................................................................... 14
3 Utilising the whole of society’s resources in preparedness ...................................... 18
PART II:   A DESCRIPTION OF PREPAREDNESS IN SOCIETY  ............................................. 20
1 Background and principles of preparedness ............................................................ 20
 1.1 Stages of development in preparedness ........................................................ 20
 1.2 Comprehensive security as a basis ................................................................ 24
 1.3 The comprehensive defence approach ........................................................... 29
2 Political guidance of preparedness .......................................................................... 31
 2.1 The reporting procedure ................................................................................ 31
 2.2 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society ....................................... 34
 2.3 Government decision on the targets of security of supply  ............................ 38
 2.4 Internal Security Programme ......................................................................... 39
3 Legislation on preparedness .................................................................................... 40
4 Preparedness arrangements .................................................................................... 43
 4.1 Decision-making and co-operation between highest organs  
  of government ............................................................................................... 43
 4.2 Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy  ....................................... 47
 4.3 Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs ............................................. 48
 4.4 Preparedness by central government ............................................................. 49
 4.5 Preparedness at regional level ....................................................................... 51
 4.6 Preparedness at municipal level .................................................................... 55
 4.7 Situation awareness  ..................................................................................... 58
 4.8 Communications ............................................................................................ 61
 4.9 Security of supply .......................................................................................... 63
 4.10 Psychological resilience to crisis  ................................................................... 66
5 International dimension of preparedness ................................................................ 68
 5.1 The European Union ...................................................................................... 68
 5.2 Nordic countries ............................................................................................ 72
 5.3 NATO ............................................................................................................. 73
6PART III:   COMMITTEE’S KEY COMMENTS AND PROPOSALS .......................................... 75
1 Enhancing proactive preparedness  ......................................................................... 75
 1.1 Development of co-operation on the basis of comprehensive security  ......... 75
 1.2 Clarity in division of powers between authorities .......................................... 76
 1.3 Access to information and situation awareness............................................. 78
2 Highest lines of authority and division of responsibilities in preparedness activity . 80
 2.1 Development of reporting procedure ............................................................. 80
 2.2 The President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign  
  and Security Policy ......................................................................................... 82
 2.3 Strengthening the Prime Minister’s duty of co-ordination ............................. 84
3 Development of the administrative structure of preparedness ................................ 85
 3.1 From a Security and Defence Committee to a more broad-based  
  Security Committee ....................................................................................... 85
 3.2 Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus on co-operation within 
  administration  .............................................................................................. 86
 3.3 Development of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness and the Meeting  
  of Preparedness Secretaries ........................................................................... 86
 3.4 Establishment of Security Secretariat ............................................................. 87
 3.6 Regional and municipal level ......................................................................... 87
 3.7 Enhancing the preparedness of citizens ......................................................... 89
4 Development of steering of preparedness concerning several administrative  
 sectors ..................................................................................................................... 90
 4.1 Security Strategy for Society .......................................................................... 90
 4.2 Internal Security Programme ......................................................................... 91
Further information on preparedness: .............................................................................. 92
7TO THE GOVERNMENT
On 17 December 2009, the Government appointed a committee to prepare a 
comprehensive analysis of society's preparedness. In line with the Government 
Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009, the report assesses the present 
comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for Securing the Functions 
Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their content, 
arrangements, lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation. The 
committee was to complete its work by 31 December 2010.
Pekka Hallberg, President of the Supreme Administrative Court, was invited to 
chair the committee and Heikki Aaltonen, Permanent State Under-Secretary, 
Tiina Astola, Permanent Secretary, Anne Brunila, Executive Vice President, 
Aapo Cederberg, General Secretary, Tarja Cronberg, Doctor of Science in 
Technology and Doctor of Social Science, Martina Harms-Aalto, Programme 
Manager, Antti Herlin, Chairman of the Board, Jaana Husu-Kallio, Director 
General, Lauri Ihalainen, ministeri (Finnish honorary title), Päivi Kairamo-Hella, 
Secretary General, Admiral Juhani Kaskeala, Chief of Defence, Lea Kauppi, 
Director General, Seppo Kääriäinen, First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Erkki 
Liikanen, Governor of the Bank of Finland, Outi Ojala, Representative of City 
Council, Antti Pelttari, State Secretary, Pekka Puska, Director-General, Jaakko 
Rauramo, vuorineuvos (Finnish honorary title), Rauno Saari, Director General, 
Anneli Taina, Director General, and Pertti Torstila, State Secretary, were invited 
as members.
Timo Härkönen, Director of Government Security, Colonel Kim Jäämeri and 
Olli Lampinen, Preparedness Co-ordinator, were appointed as the Committee 
Secretaries. Specialist Leena Huovinen and Lauri Holmström, Duty Officer, 
Government Situation Centre, were further invited as assistants to the 
committee's secretariat.
The committee worked under the name of the Hallberg Committee. It convened 
19 times and held several hearings. In its analysis of the current system of 
preparedness, the committee came to the conclusion that no substantial 
changes were required. In accordance with the assignment, the committee 
report provides an analysis of preparedness in society and includes proposals 
considered necessary to improving the current system's functionality.
Upon the project's completion, the committee hereby presents its unanimous 
report to the Government.
8Helsinki, 22 December 2010
Pekka Hallberg
Heikki Aaltonen Tiina Astola
Anne Brunila Aapo Cederberg
Tarja Cronberg Martina Harms-Aalto
Antti Herlin Jaana Husu-Kallio
Lauri Ihalainen Päivi Kairamo-Hella
Juhani Kaskeala Lea Kauppi
Seppo Kääriäinen Erkki Liikanen
Outi Ojala Antti Pelttari
Pekka Puska Jaakko Rauramo
Rauno Saari Anneli Taina
Pertti Torstila
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9ABSTRACT
Finland's preparedness arrangements are functional and in no need of major 
reform. The committee proposes development measures aimed at eliminating 
overlaps in operations and creating the preconditions for improved co-
operation.
Changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios are accentuating 
the need to examine security from a broad perspective. External and internal 
security are increasingly interlinked. The committee based its work on the 
broadest security thinking possible; that of comprehensive security.
As the vulnerability of Finnish society grows, civil society and the business 
sector's contributions to preparedness and security co-operation are becoming 
increasingly important. It is essential that we utilise the resources of the whole 
of society, from state leaders to local level. Use of such resources must be 
planned and prepared as a single entity. Close co-operation between the 
authorities, the business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual 
citizens yields results and reinforces collective responsibility.
The committee considers that, in preparedness, better account should be 
taken of the stronger role played by the business sector and the significance 
of many non-governmental organisations. The security discussion should be 
as open as possible, thereby increasing general confidence. The committee 
proposes that the co-operation required for preparedness be increased, while 
continuing the reform of the state regional administration and municipalities.
The committee emphasises that normal statutory powers should be maintained 
in the preparedness and management of disruptions. In possible conflicts of 
authority, the committee is of the view that the Constitution provides the Prime 
Minister with powers to submit the issue to the Government plenary session 
for consideration. Attention is paid by the committee to the development of 
sector-specific situation awareness, and the opportunities of national leaders 
to obtain correct, immediate information serving preparedness from senior 
officials. 
The reporting procedure is considered a key tool in outlining Finland's foreign, 
security and defence policy. The committee proposes that a clear, goal-
oriented schedule be set for the preparation of reports on comprehensive 
security, and that the Government Report on Security and Defence Policy be 
complemented, when necessary, with a new report of narrower or broader 
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scope, depending on the situation. Comprehensive security thinking requires 
that the reports' content be extended to cover the examination of new kinds 
of security issues. 
The committee considers that the operating preconditions of the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should be strengthened, while 
recognising the importance of joint meetings between this Cabinet Committee 
and the President of the Republic. The committee proposes that the Government 
Rules of Procedure be amended to make the Minister of the Interior a member 
of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. In addition, the 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy should organise open 
seminars on comprehensive security.
The committee proposes that the Security and Defence Committee be 
renamed the Security Committee, and reinforced through a broader-based 
membership, by appointing representatives of the business sector and key 
non-governmental organisations as members, as well as the National Police 
Commissioner and the Director-General of the Department for Rescue Services 
at the Ministry of the Interior. Preparatory material for the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy should also be compiled, where relevant, by the 
Security Committee. The committee further proposes that the preparation of 
security affairs be developed by reinforcing the security secretariat's position 
and operating preconditions in conjunction with the Security Committee. The 
committee does not consider the establishment of a separate security council 
necessary.
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PART I: FINNISH SOCIETY’S STRENGTHS AND 
PREPAREDNESS
1 Introduction
According to the Finnish constitution, the powers of the State in Finland are 
vested in the people, who are represented by Parliament. The constitution 
guarantees the inviolability of human dignity and the freedom and rights of 
the individual, and promotes justice in society. Democracy entails the right of 
individuals to participate and have an influence in the development of society 
and their living conditions. The strengths of Finnish society include broad-
based voluntary activities, strong local self-government, a democratic system 
of participation and networking between public authorities and the people, 
extending from personal and smaller circles to broader themes. 
The constitution reinforces civil society and fosters the building of trust in 
society. This forms an essential foundation in preparing for unexpected 
situations. The Finnish constitution also establishes the principle of the rule 
of law, according to which the wielding of power by public authorities must 
have a legal basis. All public sector activities must carefully comply with the 
law. Finnish society thus has firmly rooted confidence in the authorities and 
observance of the nation’s laws.
This forms a strong foundation for preparedness, which in Finland has traditionally 
involved authority-centred co-operation based on the comprehensive defence 
approach. Preparedness is widely felt to be an important and well-justified 
activity in Finland. This is manifested in contingency planning by the authorities, 
voluntary commitment by the business sector to activities ensuring security of 
supply, and active participation by NGOs in crisis management.
However, changes in the operating environment have an impact in the structures 
of government, business and industry, and society as a whole. Changes in 
Finland’s operating environment, both at national and international level, 
have highlighted the need to examine preparedness from a comprehensive 
perspective. The committee set up to examine these issues was to assess 
how Finnish society prepares itself, maintains its competitiveness and ability to 
function and safeguards the survival of citizens in all circumstances.
While economic integration, and globalisation in particular, provide new 
opportunities, they also pose many risks and threats that are difficult to foresee. 
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The networking of society and increasing dependence on technical systems, 
especially information technology, has constituted one of the most significant 
change trends. Factors influencing the population structure include ageing, 
and on the other hand, internationalisation, immigration and emigration. 
These must be taken into consideration as factors with an impact on Finland’s 
competitiveness and the development of the dependency ratio. 
Constant legislative and administrative changes, and particularly the state 
regional administration and municipality structure reforms, have also 
influenced the need to examine preparedness. As changes occur in the 
operating environment, it is crucial to ensure the participation of the whole 
of society in building preparedness and proactive comprehensive security. 
Viewing comprehensive security as the backbone of Finland’s competitiveness 
and well-being continues to form the foundation for co-operation between 
various actors, public authorities, the business sector and NGOs. This is not 
therefore merely a question of co-operation between various administrative 
sectors, but of networking the whole of society, of ensuring the continuity of 
Finland’s approach to preparedness even in the midst of change.
Because Finland’s preparedness arrangements are also well-functioning by 
international comparison, they require no major reforms. Co-operation between 
various actors should, however, be constantly developed by streamlining the 
structure and organisation of preparedness. At the same time, the narrow 
examination of mandate issues between various administrative sectors should 
be discarded.
In international comparisons by the World Economic Forum (WEF), Finland has been ranked 
sixth in terms of overall competitiveness in recent years, and often as first in terms of how 
well its institutions function. This indicates confidence in the functioning of systems and is 
consequently a good starting point in improving preparedness. 
In 2010, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) conducted 
a country review on public governance in Finland. According to the OECD, Finland’s future 
success and competitiveness depend on its ability to address challenges by committing to 
and implementing overall administrative solutions. This requires an ability to achieve and 
declare a common view of said challenges and available solutions at the level of society as 
a whole. Furthermore, the country review sees governmental partnerships with citizens, the 
business sector, NGOs and other interest groups as necessary, in order to meet overall public 
administration targets in responding to national and global challenges. 
Therefore, one of the key challenges the public administration faces lies in finding new ways 
of operating horizontally across various levels of administration and in co-operation with 
interest groups. Paying attention to citizen participation is the key when seeking a closer 
relationship between the administration, citizens and the business sector.
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In preparedness, particular attention should thus be paid to opening up the 
public administration towards the business sector and NGOs, and vice versa. 
Over the course of the committee’s work, it has become apparent that more 
attention must be paid to informing citizens, to the activities of NGOs and 
their participation, as well as to the business sector’s growing stake in general 
well-being and how Finland is changing as an operating environment. At 
the same time, preserving functioning co-operation between various organs 
of government – the basis of our democratic system and representative 
democracy – is crucial.
The examination of issues related to security of supply has reinforced the view 
that the emphasis has slowly shifted from emergency stockpiling to securing 
essential infrastructure and business continuity in trade and industry. Some 
duties previously handled by public authorities have already been transferred, 
and some are in the process of being transferred, to the business sector. 
Such mutual interests are also influencing the development of preparedness 
structures.
The committee’s assessment focuses on the operational and societal 
perspectives, as a counterweight to administration-oriented thinking. 
Furthermore, the aim is to shift the focus in preparedness towards proactive 
activities, identifying threats and disturbances as early as possible, and rapidly 
communicating situation awareness. By improving communication, society’s 
interest can be evoked in matters related to comprehensive security and 
preparedness, thereby increasing the level of crisis resilience in society.
This committee report is divided into three sections. The first section examines 
the strengths of Finnish society and its preparedness. Harnessing the 
resources of the whole of society in preparedness is the key point of departure. 
Preparedness is therefore a concern of all of society, all the way from state 
leadership to local level. In addition, the first section examines the need to 
assess preparedness, the establishment of the committee and the premises 
for carrying out the assignment. The Government´s Security and Defence 
Policy Report of 2009 and its parliamentary handling are key documents in 
this respect. The second section of the report discusses the current system 
of preparedness, the comprehensive defence approach, preparedness 
arrangements and their development needs, and the international dimension 
of preparedness. The third section presents the key proposals outlined by the 
committee, and the related objectives.
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2 The committee’s assignment and work
On 17.12.09, the Government appointed a committee to prepare a comprehensive 
report on preparedness in society. The memorandum on appointing the 
committee states that changes in the operating environment, administrative 
reforms and possible changes in legislation require a comprehensive analysis 
of preparedness in society during the present Government’s term of office. 
The memorandum refers to the Government Security and Defence Policy 
Report of 2009, according to which the committee report shall examine the 
present comprehensive defence approach, the Strategy for Securing the 
Functions Vital to Society, the Internal Security Programme as well as their 
content, arrangements, lines of authority, responsibilities and implementation. 
In conjunction with this, the Government report suggests that consideration 
should be given to establishing a national security council. Thus, the committee’s 
assignment has been further specified in the Security and Defence Policy 
Report and its parliamentary handling, which was to be taken into account in 
the assessment.
The committee was tasked with assessing the current system’s functionality, 
possible operational overlaps, deficiencies in responsibilities and open questions 
arising from changes in the operating environment. Mapping out the current 
system is of major importance as a starting point. The committee’s work is 
concerned with examining improved co-ordination, clear responsibilities and 
functionality, on the basis of a broad concept of security. No fundamental 
changes are required in preparedness structures. 
The committee has also taken account of other reforms related to the same 
theme, such as reports by the committee appointed to consider the revision of 
the Finnish Constitution, the working group on promoting security co-operation 
between the public and private sectors, and the working group on military 
conscription. 
The committee decided to call itself the Hallberg committee. Based on a broad 
view of security, the committee began work from the premise that it is essential 
to involve the whole of society in improving preparedness. More prominence 
should be given to the views of civil society, and individual citizens should be 
kept sufficiently informed of personal preparedness. The committee therefore 
aimed to use the clearest and most comprehensive concepts possible in its 
work. Everyone’s contribution is vital to Finland’s security. 
As part of its task, the committee examined the structures and steering of 
preparedness. In this, attention was also paid to co-operation between 
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the highest organs of government and to developing organisations and 
responsibilities within the administration. As regards the steering of preparedness 
activities, the committee looked into the reporting procedure and overlaps in 
preparedness documents, as well as the document hierarchy. In addition, in 
line with its assignment, it evaluated the comprehensive defence approach. 
Here, particular attention was paid to matters related to security of supply, 
the involvement of the business sector and civil society in preparedness, and 
further development of co-operation within the public administration. 
The preparedness obligation and its justification have also been defined in 
legislation on preparedness. In accordance with the Emergency Powers Act 
(1991/1080), the Government, the state administrative authorities, state 
businesses and other state authorities, as well as municipalities, must ensure 
that their duties are performed with the least disruption, including in emergency 
conditions, by means of emergency plans, prior preparation of emergency 
procedures and other measures. 
From the point of view of securing functions vital to society, however, account 
must be taken of preparedness, crisis management and recovery from crises. 
Precautionary measures include contingency planning and the related prior 
preparation, such as training and preparedness exercises. Preparedness 
measures are aimed at the anticipation, management and after-care of 
disturbances and emergency conditions. Preparedness is always part of an 
organisation’s normal operations. During this process, existing legislation is 
complied with, and planned measures must be based on measures regulated 
under law.
As noted above, the committee assignment was further specified in the 
Government’s Security and Defence Policy Report of 2009 and the parliamentary 
handling of this report. In the following, reference is made to parts of these 
documents. The introduction to the Security and Defence Policy Report states 
that the report lays a foundation for all reports, strategies and programmes 
prepared by the Government on security and international relations. According 
to the report, these include the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to 
Society and the Internal Security Programme.
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A report by the Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 5/2009 vp) states the following:
“...the committee notes that some of the documents that should be founded on the report have 
been completed prior to the report’s completion (such as the Internal Security Programme). 
For this reason, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers it important that the relationship 
between the Security and Defence Policy Report and other Government reports, strategies and 
programmes dealing with security and international relations be evaluated when developing 
the security and defence policy reporting procedure. Structural inconsistency and too much 
emphasis on a detailed description of the security environment were a problematic aspect 
of the reports. On each occasion, the report’s preparation has been organised differently, 
and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Prime Minister’s Office 
have each in turn been in charge of its preparation. The committee would particularly like 
clarification of the report’s steering role with regard to the Strategy for Securing the Functions 
Vital to Society and the Internal Security Programme. The Foreign Affairs Committee states 
that a clearer, tighter schedule should be established for the preparation and parliamentary 
handling of Government reports on security and defence policy.”
“The Foreign Affairs Committee requires that a consistent recommendation on the strategic 
hierarchy of comprehensive security, and an assessment of the development of the security 
and defence policy reporting procedure, be included in the report. Parliament requires that 
the report be developed into a comprehensive security strategy providing balanced guidance 
for the development of all administrative sectors operating in the field of security.”
The Defence Committee (PuVL 4/2009 vp) states the following:
“Systematic development of the Defence Forces’ activities requires long-term guidelines 
in the future too. The Defence Committee considers this a central aspect of evaluating 
the desirability of continuing the reporting procedure. It would, however, be necessary to 
develop the reporting process. In monitoring the security environment, a four-year time span 
is too slow and inflexible. Without anticipating the outcome of this analysis, the committee 
would like to emphasise that the current co-ordination mechanism functions well. Finland 
is a small country with limited resources. Key actors in various administrative sectors are 
already represented in several overlapping organisations. For this reason, the focus should be 
primarily on developing the current operating model, instead of establishing completely new 
organs. The committee also considers it necessary that further work evaluate whether the 
term ‘comprehensive defence’ should be changed to better reflect the content in question.”
In its statement, the Administration Committee (HaVL 6/2009 vp) notes that it:
“... requires that in future, the topic of internal security should be treated on an equal basis to 
security and defence policy in the reporting procedure. Furthermore, the committee requires 
that future security and defence policy reports be divided into various sections, internal 
security comprising one of them.” 
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The committee convened a total of 19 times. During its work, in line with its 
assignment the committee consulted experts in the field of comprehensive 
security. The committee secretariat consulted heads of preparedness at the 
ministries.
The committee consulted the following people, listed in order of hearing:
 • Risto Volanen, State Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office
 • Pertti Torstila, State Secretary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
 • Anne Holmlund, Minister of the Interior
 • Kari Rimpi, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence
 • General Ari Puheloinen, Chief of Defence
 • Päivi Kairamo-Hella, Secretary General, Office of the President of the 
Republic
 • Jaakko Rauramo, vuorineuvos (Finnish honorary title), Council for Security 
of Supply and Infrastructure
 • Kari Jalas, Dr. Pol. Sc.
 • Ilkka Kananen, Chief Executive Officer, National Emergency Supply Agency
 • Jaakko Laajava, Under-Secretary of State, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
 • Anneli Taina, Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for 
Southern Finland
 • Rauno Saari, Director General, Regional State Administrative Agency for 
Southwestern Finland
 • Tapio Tossavainen, Preparedness Manager, Centre for Economic 
Development, Transport and the Environment for Uusimaa
 • Markku Haiko, Development Manager, Association of Finnish Local and 
Regional Authorities
 • Bishop Eero Huovinen
 • Diocesan Secretary Kirsti Poutiainen
 • Mikael Pentikäinen, Senior Editor-in-Chief, Helsingin Sanomat
 • Lauri Kivinen, Director General of the Finnish Broadcasting Company YLE
 • Håkan Mattlin, Director General, Ministry of Education
 • Mika Rossi, State Secretary, Prime Minister’s Office
 • Mikko Paatero, National Police Commissioner, National Police Board
 • Brigadier General Mikko Kirjavainen, Border Guard Headquarters
 • Lieutenant General Arto Räty, Defence Command
 • Commodore Kari Takanen, Defence Command
 • Colonel Sakari Wallinmaa, Defence Command
 • Lieutenant Colonel Pasi Välimäki, Defence Command
 • Teemu Tanner, Director General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs
On 27 July 2010, the committee met with President of the Republic, Tarja 
Halonen, who extensively examined the issues handled by the committee and 
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presented her own views on the basic outlines of its work. The committee 
Chair consulted Prime Ministers Mari Kiviniemi and Matti Vanhanen, as well as 
Minister of Defence Jyri Häkämies. The Chair reported on these meetings to 
the committee.
3 Utilising the whole of society’s resources in preparedness
The committee based its work on the broadest security thinking possible; that 
of comprehensive security. Due to their nature, preparing for and responding 
to wide-ranging security threats requires strong international and national co-
operation, as well as prearranged collaborative mechanisms. Preparedness 
in Finland has traditionally been authority-centred and based on strong co-
operation.
Indeed, co-operation between administrative sectors is important, since they 
usually have only one set of resources, for use in all possible security situations. 
For this reason, the use and mobilisation of these resources should be planned 
and prepared holistically. The principle of good governance has fostered trust 
in the rule of law in Finland. Since preparedness activities extend over a long 
period of time, the civil service occupies a key position in ensuring continuity 
of preparedness.
As new threats have made Finnish society increasingly vulnerable, the 
contribution of civil society and the business sector to preparedness and 
security co-operation is ever more important. Moreover, growing pressures 
for cost efficiency are constantly shaping structures and practices within the 
administration and business sector. Alongside techno-economic development, 
interdependencies between production, services and the whole of society have 
increased. At the same time, the trend of focusing on operations related to core 
competencies has led to a growth in outsourcing and service acquisition from 
outside an organisation. As a result of this development, the business sector’s 
importance in securing functions vital to society is constantly increasing.
Situations that threaten functions vital to society often have diverse 
impacts. Their prevention, management and after-care require the efforts 
of authorities within various administrative sectors, as well as professionals 
and volunteers within the private sector. Companies possess and control a 
significant portion of society’s resources, both under normal conditions and 
during serious disturbances of normal conditions. However, in modern global 
markets companies disperse their production chains between several countries 
and continents, depending on where the required operations are cheapest 
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to perform and for which market the company caters. Due to this structural 
change in the business sector, the state has fewer direct steering opportunities. 
This development is likely to continue.
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play an important role in society 
by fostering and developing a sense of community, civic education and 
individuals’ opportunities to have an influence. With regard to NGO activities, 
particular attention has been paid to their non-profit nature and their direct 
and indirect benefits to society. NGOs enable the actions of the authorities to 
be complemented in the appropriate manner, while providing the authorities 
with the opportunity to target their resources at areas unsuitable for voluntary 
activities. Moreover, activities within NGOs encourage people to do voluntary 
work, often on an altruistic basis.
NGOs contribute to society’s material, spiritual and social capital, reinforce 
public sector activity and fulfil requirements set for public sector activity. When 
constructing and upholding psychological resilience in a crisis, NGOs occupy 
a key position. Their independence provides them with their characteristic 
agility and swiftness. In a crisis situation, they are often the first to provide 
aid. NGOs and their international organisations, such as the international Red 
Cross, have existing international contingency and preparedness systems that 
can also be employed in Finnish conditions. Furthermore, at local level NGOs 
create stability, a sense of security and trust, thanks to their being well-known, 
with a position close to the community and individuals. NGOs also gather and 
transmit information between citizens and authorities.
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PART II: A DESCRIPTION OF PREPAREDNESS  
IN SOCIETY 
1 Background and principles of preparedness
1.1 Stages of development in preparedness
The current form of preparedness by central government can be considered as 
having begun in spring 1977, when a Defence Council memorandum included 
a new definition of emergency conditions. Alongside a military crisis (war), 
economic crises and major accidents were defined as ”emergency conditions” 
requiring preparedness. Prior to this, the preparation of society for war was 
mainly handled by the Defence Forces and special defence organs (advisory 
boards), while the normal administration took no systematic part in planning 
and preparation. Liaison officers and military offices run by the Defence Forces 
had been given representation on the most important national boards. For war-
time arrangements under economic defence, a National Board of Economic 
Defence was established in 1955. The Board was modelled on the National 
Defence Council of Wartime Economy, in operation between 1929 and 1936.
In 1975, the Advisory Board for Defence Information, a permanent parliamentary 
committee, was established. The advisory board was preceded by the Advisory 
Board for Mental Defence in 1964−1975. Work of the Advisory Board for Defence 
Information is based on a decree enacted in 1975 (1073/75). The Advisory 
Board for Defence Information is tasked with planning the communication 
of national defence information in both normal and emergency conditions. It 
also monitors the development of the Finnish people’s views in matters closely 
related to national defence. The decree on the Advisory Board for Defence 
Information is currently under reform, with the aim of issuing a new decree 
before the parliamentary elections in the spring of 2011.
The purpose of this was that in times of war, normal administrative 
arrangements and organisations would be replaced by a special national 
system of commanders/organisations. First to obtain approval, in 1959, was 
the plan for a nationwide organisation of transport commanders. Finally, on 23 
February 1973, the Defence Council confirmed the arrangement prepared by 
the National Board of Economic Defence, whereby Finland would be divided 
into 13 centralised national organisations in time of war (guidelines for the 
division of duties in a controlled economy). However, by only the following 
year, the legal basis of this arrangement was being questioned. In November 
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1974, the Ministry of Trade and Industry, responsible for the steering of the 
National Board of Economic Defence, established a working group to assess 
the appropriateness of the system. 
In its report of 17 October 1975, the working group proposed that account be taken of 
the needs and requirements of emergency conditions in arrangements covering normal 
conditions. These principles were confirmed by the Defence Council in its memorandum of 
2 November 1982, which also defined co-operation between the Defence Forces and other 
parts of the administration in preparedness-related issues. The working group also proposed 
the appointment of special heads of preparedness in ministries, to lead national defence 
preparations within their respective administrative sectors. Decisions regarding heads of 
preparedness were taken as early as August 1978, when the Defence Council decided on 
the appointment of heads of preparedness within ministries and on certain national boards, 
to lead preparedness arrangements. This provision was confirmed by a letter from the Prime 
Minister to the ministries, dated 29 December 1978. The heads of preparedness thus entered 
their posts at the beginning of 1979. In most cases, the permanent secretaries of Ministries 
were appointed as heads of preparedness, while the permanent secretary of the Prime 
Minister’s Office was appointed to chair the group.
The first exercise for heads of preparedness at ministries was organised under the Defence 
Council secretariat in 1981. Civil servants responsible for practical exercise arrangements 
at ministries were then organised into a system of preparedness secretaries. The system of 
separate national commanders mentioned earlier was gradually abolished in the 1980s. 
Steered by the Defence Council and its secretariat, the preparedness system functioned 
fairly well. By the end of the 1990s, national preparedness had reached a level of quality 
considered high in international comparisons.
In February 1992, the Defence Council repealed its previous guidelines (1977, 1982) 
and brought disturbances in normal conditions and crisis situations within the scope of 
preparedness. This added a new dimension to preparedness, while definitively transferring 
its administration to the sphere of normal operational responsibilities and powers. On 28 
November 1994, an addition was made to the Government Rules of Procedure concerning 
the activities of heads of preparedness. Drawn up by the Defence Council, the memorandum 
Varautuminen yhteiskunnan häiriötilanteisiin ja poikkeusoloihin, 1999 (Contingency planning 
for disturbances and emergency conditions in society, 1999) modernised previous guidelines 
and memorandums. 
In September 1999, the Prime Minister’s Office set up a so-called defence 
council working group, tasked with examining the Defence Council’s status 
and the development of legislation related to its tasks. As the Constitution of 
Finland (731/1999) became effective, the Defence Council was abolished at 
the beginning of March 2000. Its duties were divided between the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. The 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy was also tasked with 
handling important issues related to comprehensive defence. In addition, 
the committee considers issues related to the co-ordination of matters falling 
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within its mandate. Handling matters related to foreign and security policy, and 
to Finland’s relations with other states, the cabinet committee may convene 
together with the President. Such joint meetings have become established 
practice. 
The Security and Defence Committee, based at the Ministry of Defence, was 
established for the co-ordination and preparation of comprehensive defence. 
Its tasks include the monitoring of changes in Finland’s security and defence 
policy position and assessing the impact of such changes on comprehensive 
defence arrangements. The committee also monitors measures taken by 
various administrative sectors to maintain and develop comprehensive defence 
arrangements, while co-ordinating the preparation of issues falling within 
the scope of comprehensive defence within various administrative sectors. 
The committee may issue statements and take initiatives in matters related 
to comprehensive defence and issues concerning the reconciliation of such 
matters. 
The Security and Defence Committee assists the Ministry of Defence and 
the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy in matters related to 
comprehensive defence. This committee has a secretariat based at the Ministry 
of Defence. A forum of preparedness secretaries, comprising the preparedness 
secretaries at the ministries and some national boards, assists the secretariat in 
co-ordinating the preparation of matters. The Ministry of Defence is in charge 
of co-ordinating the comprehensive defence approach. The Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy has been assigned the highest political steering 
responsibility regarding the monitoring and development of the comprehensive 
defence approach and the co-ordination of related matters.
In line with the comprehensive concept of security and the definition of 
comprehensive defence, permanent secretaries of all ministries and the 
Secretary General of the Office of the President of the Republic are involved 
in the Security and Defence Committee. These arrangements have created 
better preconditions for the Security and Defence Committee’s steering of 
development and monitoring of the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital 
to Society. Permanent secretaries are responsible for leading and monitoring 
the ministries’ operations, as well as for the preparation and follow-up 
of targets in their respective administrative sectors. In addition, they take 
care of preparedness and security within their administrative sectors. In the 
practical implementation of tasks related to preparedness and security, they 
are assisted by heads of preparedness and preparedness secretaries, as well 
as the ministries’ Preparedness Committees.
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According to the revised rules of the meeting of the ministries’ heads of 
preparedness (2007), the purpose of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness 
is to function as a permanent co-operation body between the ministries, 
reconciling preparedness arrangements of the ministries and supporting 
competent authorities, ministries and the Government when necessary, as 
laid down in the central government crisis management model. Chairmanship 
of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness was transferred from the Prime 
Minister’s permanent secretary to the Director of Government Security. At the 
same time, some ministries reformed their arrangements regarding heads 
of preparedness. The position, powers and role of heads of preparedness 
and preparedness secretaries within their ministries varies. The Strategy for 
Securing the Functions Vital to Society of 2006 defines a crisis management 
model that allows for meetings of heads of preparedness to convene either 
regularly, or in accordance with the government crisis management model.
Previously, the preparation of civil defence and preparedness, as well as powers 
associated with emergency conditions, were based on civil defence legislation 
in particular. Civil defence activities began in 1927 with the establishment of 
Suomen Kaasupuolustusyhdistys (the Finnish Gas Defence Association). The 
first civil defence act dates from 1939 (374/1939). It defined civil defence as 
the protection of the population and its property from destruction caused by 
war or similar conditions, limitation of the related damage and the alleviation 
of its consequences. The civil defence act of 1958 was amended in 1990, 
based on proposals from the civil protection committee, and the construction 
of civil defence shelters was extended to the entire country.
The current legislative basis of civil defence is included in the Rescue Act. 
Rescue services, in which civil defence was included, changed considerably 
with the enactment of the Rescue Act at the beginning of 2004. At the time, 
the rescue service system maintained by municipalities was changed from a 
service organised by individual municipalities to a regional system, whereby 
the country is divided into 22 regions. Responsibility for managing various 
rescue service duties is shared by the state and regional rescue services. Civil 
defence duties are defined as the rescue services’ responsibility under the 
Rescue Act. Various civil defence duties are also specified for municipalities 
and other authorities. Expertise in civil protection and material preparedness 
are required under normal conditions too, in major accidents and other serious 
disturbances. The Government’s proposal (HE 257/2010 vp) on reforming 
the Rescue Act, with proposals concerning the reform of provisions on civil 
defence, has been submitted to Parliament.
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The system for security of supply was created not only to uphold and develop 
co-operation between the authorities and the business sector, but also to 
function as a body for planning economic defence. Activities began with the 
establishment of the National Board of Economic Defence on 23 December 
1955. Over the decades, security of supply has developed from preparing for 
military crises into securing the business continuity of enterprises and the 
protection of critical infrastructure, with a strong international dimension. 
The authorities participate in the planning of security of supply as part of 
their statutory preparedness duties, and in order to maintain contacts with 
companies within their own sector. 
Although the business sector has no general statutory duty to participate 
in the planning of security of supply, this is done on a voluntary basis. For 
companies, preparedness activities have been based on their business needs 
and on agreements made with clients and the related risk management. 
In 2008, the targets and organisation for security of supply were reformed. 
The National Board of Economic Defence was abolished and the Council for 
Security of Supply and Infrastructure was established in its place. The Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy is responsible for administrative steering 
of security of supply. The system for security of supply forms part of the 
comprehensive defence approach. This is evident, for instance, in a working 
economy and infrastructure constituting one of seven essential functions, as 
defined in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society.
1.2 Comprehensive security as a basis
The security of society faces a variety of threats, both military and non-military. 
These security threats are intertwined, difficult to predict and give little warning. 
Changes in the operating environment and threat scenarios have therefore 
given rise to a need to examine security as broadly as possible.
The comprehensive concept of security comprises security issues which, if 
exacerbated, may turn into threats that can jeopardise or seriously harm 
Finland, Finns or the functions vital to Finnish society. Wide-ranging threats 
include premeditated action such as armed aggression, terrorism or network 
interference. They can also occur spontaneously, such as widespread failures 
of the electricity grid, various biological hazards, such as infectious diseases, 
or extreme forces of nature. The threat scenarios for functions vital to society 
have been devised with comprehensive security in mind, and provide the basis 
for contingency planning.
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Many of the risks posed to the Baltic Sea coastal states, such as shipping and 
nuclear safety-related disasters and environmental threats, fall under the rubric 
of comprehensive security. Furthermore, international organised crime, the 
narcotics trade and human trafficking, as well as infectious diseases, require 
preparedness from Finland. In such cases, national and international inter-
authority co-operation across administrative sectors becomes increasingly 
important.
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Maritime safety
Strong growth in shipping in the Baltic Sea is a burden on the marine ecology and increases 
the risk of serious oil and chemical accidents, particularly in the Gulf of Finland. Co-ordination 
of authority operations, uniform, previously agreed operating principles, and measures aimed 
at protecting the sea area, will gain in significance in national and international co-operation 
between authorities, particularly in the Baltic Sea region.
The European Union’s integrated maritime policy will be developed in order to establish a 
more co-ordinated system for monitoring and information exchange. This will be achieved 
by bringing together existing monitoring and tracking systems used for maritime safety 
and security, protection of the marine environment, fisheries control, control of external 
borders and other law enforcement activities. Within the framework of EU’s strategy for the 
Baltic Sea, special characteristics of the Baltic Sea region will be taken into account in the 
implementation of maritime policy. These will include encouraging Russia to commitment to 
co-operation.
The purpose of integrated maritime surveillance and information exchange is to achieve 
situation awareness, in support of rational decision-making, of maritime activities that 
influence maritime safety and security measures, border surveillance, the marine environment, 
fisheries control, trade and the European Union’s economic interests, as well as general law 
enforcement and defence. In line with the aforementioned principles, a common information 
exchange environment for the Baltic Sea region is being developed under the MARSUNO 
project. In Finland, nearly all maritime authorities associated with the above-mentioned 
measures participate in the project.
Source: Jarmo Saarinen, West Finland Coast Guard District
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The ash cloud
On 20 March 2010, the Eyjafjallajökull volcano began to erupt in Iceland. On 14 April, the 
eruption began to generate large amounts of ash, with volcanic ash drifting into European 
airspace due to prevalent winds. For flight safety reasons, airspace was closed in Northern 
and Central Europe. The ash cloud caused a total air traffic closedown in Northern and Central 
Europe between 15 and 19 April. In Finland, airspace was closed on 15 April and partly 
reopened on 19 April. Most European countries reopened their airspaces on 21 April. The 
volcanic eruption in Iceland was a case of disturbance in which defining overall responsibility 
for national-level leadership was difficult. 
All ministries analysed the situation from the perspective of their own administrative sector, 
and managed tasks falling within their purview. The competent authority for air traffic was 
the Finnish Transport Safety Agency (Trafi), alongside Finavia participating in operational 
activities. Moreover, the Finnish Meteorological Institute constantly produced situational 
information on the ash cloud for the authorities.
Source: MSNBC
New security threats, taking increasingly diverse forms, require various types 
of co-operation-based preparedness. Finland’s security and defence policy 
guidelines take account of changes in the global operating environment, in 
accordance with the comprehensive concept of security. Globalisation requires 
goal-oriented, consistent and proactive action, as well as the capability to react 
swiftly to changes in the environment.
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Influenza A(H1N1) virus
In 2009, the influenza A(H1N1) virus caused a pandemic, the end of which was declared 
by the World Health Organisation WHO in August 2010. The influenza (”swine flu”) started 
to spread through Finland in the latter half of 2009, causing the death of approximately 
50 people by February 2010, with an estimated 100,000 infections. On 24 April 2009, the 
Government Situation Centre received news of virus’ spread in Mexico. Shortly afterwards, the 
Finnish embassy in Mexico contacted the Situation Centre directly, reporting on the situation 
on site. The Situation Centre further informed the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, which 
initiated measures of its own. Among other measures, a pandemic co-ordination group was 
set up at the Ministry and tasked with co-ordinating operations together with the heads 
of preparedness, in joint consultation within the administration. Other ministries also took 
action in accordance with their pandemic plans.
Nowadays, external and internal security are increasingly interlinked. Open 
intersectoral collaboration and partnership arrangements with NGOs, 
companies and other non-state actors are further emphasised. Public 
authorities, the business sector and NGOs co-ordinate their contingency 
plans in view of various crises, thus enabling prompt use of every actor’s 
resources in any security situation. However, the Government is responsible for 
ensuring that this operational model functions in all situations. Finland’s view 
of comprehensive security has been concretised in the threat scenarios and 
operational principles laid out in the Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital 
to Society of 2003 and 2006, and in the Security Strategy for Society 2010.
National and international co-operation guarantees interoperability, cost-
effective development and competence management. Wide-ranging co-
operation provides for the internationalisation of Finnish competence and 
expertise. National networking particularly develops competence and a 
sustainable and comprehensive infrastructure. Networking raises society’s crisis 
tolerance and security of supply. Close co-operation between the authorities, 
the business sector, non-governmental organisations and individual citizens 
yields results. It also reinforces the will to defend the nation and bolsters 
collective responsibility.
The committee believes that it would not be expedient to define comprehensive 
security in specific detail; the concept has been defined extensively enough 
in the Security Strategy for Society. Moreover, providing the concept with 
a precise, watertight definition would go against its broad nature. Natural 
change occurs within predefined threat models, as a result of which new kinds 
of threats emerge. Although, in accordance with the comprehensive concept 
of security, the committee has taken various security situations and threats 
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into consideration, focusing on more serious security issues and reinforcing 
communal preparedness was more pertinent to its work.
1.3 The comprehensive defence approach
The comprehensive defence approach is a result of decades of development 
and a key constituent of Finland’s national security. Based on co-operation 
and a broad security perspective, comprehensive defence requires the co-
ordination and drawing of expertise from various administrative sectors. Co-
ordination is required, for instance, when monitoring changes in the security 
environment and analysing the repercussions of such changes, in building and 
maintaining resources, in preparations and exercises related to preparedness, 
as well as in the employment of resources required in crisis management. In 
line with the division of duties between ministries, the Ministry of Defence is in 
charge of co-ordinating the comprehensive defence approach. 
As defined in the Government Rules of Procedure (262/2003), section 16, the mandate of 
the Ministry of Defence covers the co-ordination of comprehensive defence. The explanatory 
memorandum to the Government Rules of Procedure considers comprehensive defence to 
encompass 
“...all military and civilian functions by which Finland’s sovereignty and the living conditions 
and security of its citizens are safeguarded against any external threats, threats from other 
nations, or any other threats.”
The memorandum states that co-ordination of the comprehensive defence approach involves 
“...synchronising measures of the public sector — that is, the Government, State authorities 
and the municipalities — and the private sector and voluntary activities by citizens, in order 
to maintain functions vital to society under all circumstances.”
Development of the comprehensive defence approach began in the Defence 
Council in 1958, gradually evolving into the current concept of comprehensive 
defence. In other respects too, the Defence Council had a key position in the 
preparation and planning of comprehensive defence and the related legislation. 
According to the comprehensive defence approach, all authorities, the 
business sector and non-governmental organisations should jointly prepare for 
all situations, on the basis of a common mission statement. For its part, the 
Defence Council also furthered the expertise of those in charge of comprehensive 
defence, aiming to ensure more efficient co-operation between responsible 
actors by issuing a recommendation on the establishment of national and 
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regional national defence courses. In addition, the Defence Council steered 
the development of security of supply and defence information, as part of the 
comprehensive defence approach.
In addition to the Defence Council, parliamentary defence committees also 
participated in the development of comprehensive defence. They highlighted 
the strong connection between comprehensive defence and foreign policy, 
expanded on and specified the concept of comprehensive defence, and 
reinforced its position as a guiding principle of preparedness. The second 
parliamentary defence committee proposed that it should be possible to 
complement and reform the comprehensive defence approach, when such 
actions are necessitated by changes in the security environment.
Responsibilities related to comprehensive defence have been laid down in laws 
and decrees. The Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy prepares 
important matters concerning comprehensive defence and its co-ordination. 
Each ministry and respective administrative sector is responsible for tasks 
related to comprehensive defence.
Development of the comprehensive defence approach has influenced 
legislation and its application, thereby creating preconditions for safeguarding 
the independence of the state and the livelihood and security of citizens 
against diverse, wide-ranging threats. The comprehensive defence approach 
also involves the principle of securing the authorities’ powers to manage their 
duties, by means of legislation, in both normal and emergency conditions. 
This forms the foundation of the Strategies for Securing the Functions Vital to 
Society and the new Security Strategy for Society. These strategies form the 
basis of the practical implementation of the comprehensive defence approach 
and the development of preparedness throughout society.
For competent actors within the system, the comprehensive defence approach 
has formed a kind of network, within which they are responsible for contingency 
planning within their own area of responsibility, as defined under legislation. 
Thus, the comprehensive defence approach can be described as an arrangement 
for co-ordinating such activities. At the same time, the comprehensive defence 
approach also steers these preparations through defined objectives and 
principles, such as democracy, cost-efficiency and legitimacy. Indeed, the 
approach has provided a suitable, renewable foundation for national security. 
Addressing security from a comprehensive perspective has proven highly 
suitable for the management of wide-ranging threats.
The Defence Council comprehensively monitored and steered the 
implementation and development of the comprehensive defence approach, 
31
covering preparation of the report, national defence training, security of supply 
and the preparedness of various administrative sectors. When the Defence 
Council was abolished, its tasks were divided between the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy and the Ministry of Defence. Matters related 
to comprehensive defence, such as the Government Security and Defence 
Policy Report of 2001 and the Government resolutions on securing functions 
vital to society from 2003, 2006 and 2010, have been handled by the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and prepared by the Security and 
Defence Committee. Although the report in question is a Government report, 
it should be noted that the President has also been involved in the reporting 
process. In further development of the comprehensive security approach, it is 
therefore necessary to ensure arrangements that enable the comprehensive 
handling of security matters at the highest political and administrative levels.
2 Political guidance of preparedness
2.1 The reporting procedure
In the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s, the parliamentary dimension of 
security and defence policy was strengthened through parliamentary defence 
committees. Committing political actors to defence development, particularly 
with regard to material capabilities, was a key objective. After the third 
committee’s work (1980–1981), this process was deemed too cumbersome. A 
lighter procedure was chosen by the parliamentary council for defence policy 
(1986) and the preceding defence policy committee (1990). With the end of 
the Cold War and Finland’s membership of the European Union, the security 
policy debate changed in Finland. 
In the mid-1990s, this development led to the creation of the security 
and defence policy reporting procedure. The first Government report was 
submitted in 1995. Focusing solely on security policy, this report included no 
separate defence policy guidelines. In their current form, security and defence 
policy reports have been issued in 1997, 2001, 2004 and 2009. The reporting 
procedure has thus become a key tool in outlining Finland’s security and 
defence policy. 
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Section 44 of the Constitution of Finland prescribes that the Government may present a 
statement or report to Parliament on a matter relating to the governance of the country, or its 
international relations. Unlike consideration of a statement, no decision on confidence in the 
Government or one of its Members can be taken during consideration of a report.
In accordance with section 23 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, government statements 
and government reports are presented to Parliament and tabled for a later session, in which 
they will be considered off the agenda. The report is then referred to a committee for 
preparation. After handling the report, the committee requests Parliament’s opinion on it, 
following which Parliament determines the final content of its opinion.
In addition to parliamentary handling and approval of government reports, 
Parliament’s opportunities for participation have been increased by setting 
up a parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group, comprising Members 
of Parliament from various parties (including the opposition). Since the 2004 
report, the monitoring group has also participated in the report’s preparation 
process. In their consideration of the 2009 security and defence policy report, 
the parliamentary committees stated the following:
The Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 5/2009 vp) notes in its report that
“The reports should place greater emphasis on the Government’s security and defence policy 
objectives and measures taken to meet these objectives. In particular, the Foreign Affairs 
Committee would like clarification on the report’s guiding role regarding the Strategy for 
Securing the Functions Vital to Society and the Internal Security Programme.”
In addition, the Foreign Affairs Committee has stated the following:
“Adopting the comprehensive concept of security as the premise for the Government reports 
on security and defence policy has represented a significant change, in terms of content, 
which has gradually gained ground. Along with the adoption of a comprehensive concept 
of security, the steering impact of the security and defence policy reports has also begun 
to focus on the administrative sectors of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the 
Interior. However, no clear definition of the concepts of comprehensive security and new 
threats has been provided, which conflicts with the politically potent, useful nature of such 
definitions. Particularly with regard to so-called new threats, in its current form the report 
is imbalanced in terms of describing the security environment, and drawing up guidelines 
based on such a description.”
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In its statement, the Administration Committee (HaVL 6/2009 vp) notes that
“Measures aimed at developing internal security receive less attention and have a secondary 
position in the Government. This may be partly attributed to tradition, in which the adoption 
of a comprehensive concept of security is a relatively new development. In particular, action 
and implementation plans missing from the report constitute a problem from the internal 
security point of view. The Administration Committee requires that, in the future, the topic of 
internal security be treated on an equal basis to security and defence policy in the reporting 
procedure. Furthermore, the committee requires that, in the future, the security and defence 
policy report be divided into various sections, internal security comprising one of these.” 
The Defence Committee (PuVL 4/2009 vp) states the following:
“... the name ‘monitoring group’ is misleading, as the group’s activities are clearly parallel, or 
even anticipatory, with respect to the actual reporting process. The monitoring group prepares 
its own evaluations of Finland’s security environment and the group’s recommendations are 
expected to have an influence on the content of the Government report. The monitoring 
group’s preliminary opinions, on matters that were supposed to be brought up only when 
presenting the report, have been heard in public. Differences in views or focus areas between 
the monitoring group’s report and the Government report may therefore constitute a 
problem.”
The Government report begins with an overview of the international situation, 
followed by an appraisal of how changes in it may affect Finland. These are 
followed by guidelines for the security and defence policy. The final chapter 
shows how these guidelines will be implemented in practice, to improve 
Finland’s security. While the report provides a very extensive description of 
security issues from the perspective of various administrative sectors, only the 
Defence Forces are presented with capability requirements.
Due to the dualistic nature of the report, Parliament has varying views as 
to which committee should issue a report on the Government report. The 
security and defence policy reports of 1995, 1997 and 2009 were handled 
by the Foreign Affairs Committee, whereas the 2001 and 2004 reports were 
assigned to the Defence Committee.
A Government outline issued every four years on developments in the Finnish 
security environment covers a long time span, rendering it too slow and 
inflexible. In four years’ time, unexpected changes may occur (for instance, the 
terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the global financial crisis), rendering 
the report less topical and its assessments less precise.
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On each occasion, the preparation of the report has been organised differently, 
and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence and the Prime 
Minister’s Office have been in charge of preparation in turn. In addition, the 
President has had substantial involvement in the reporting process. The Security 
and Defence Committee co-ordinated the preparation of the 2001 defence and 
security policy report. Working groups were set up for the preparation of the 
2004 and 2009 reports. The various bodies involved in this preparation have 
brought their own administrative sector’s views to the process, rendering it 
difficult to avoid repetition and overlaps. In order to ensure a more structured, 
co-ordinated preparation process, more broad-based preparation is required, 
across the administrative boundaries of ministries.
With regard to the reporting procedure, the Foreign Affairs Committee (UaVM 
5/2009 vp) notes in its report that
”…a clearer, tighter schedule should be established for the preparation and parliamentary 
handling of Government reports on security and defence policy. The report should be 
submitted to Parliament so that parliamentary handling can take place in the second 
parliamentary session of the parliamentary term at the latest. A tighter procedure would also 
render the report’s guiding impact more effective. In its current form, the report’s structure 
is too heavy and it has become too extensive for civic information purposes. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee considers it a structural deficiency of the latest report (2009) that Finland’s 
security and defence policy guidelines have not been presented in a consistent, clear manner. 
Parliament requires that the report be developed into a comprehensive security strategy 
providing balanced guidance for the development of all administrative sectors in the field of 
security, including resources.”
2.2 Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society
The most important functions of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy 
are safeguarding Finland’s independence, territorial integrity and society’s basic 
values, advancing the security and well-being of its citizens and sustaining 
the functioning of society. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to 
Society is a Government resolution that provides grounds for securing these 
objectives. Even by international comparison, the strategy provides a unique 
way of comprehensively handling and steering preparedness. Many countries 
have shown interest in this Finnish concept and are developing their own 
security strategies in the same direction.
The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society is the Government’s 
steering document for the ministries. For its part, the strategy gives tangible 
form to the security and defence policy report and complements other steering 
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documents issued by the Government, dealing with various aspects of security. 
The strategy therefore forms a common basis for preparedness and crisis 
management for all actors in society. The Government resolutions of 2003 and 
2006, on securing the functions vital to society, define such vital functions and 
the responsibilities of various administrative sectors in safeguarding them. 
The comprehensive, intersectoral perspective is also emphasised in the 
resolution revised in 2010. Based on co-ordination by the Security and Defence 
Committee, the resolution was updated to reflect anticipated near-future 
developments in Finland’s security environment. An intersectoral writing group 
was set up for the updating process, in order to ensure that account is taken 
of the views of various administrative sectors and other actors. The reviewed 
resolution of 2010 pays specific attention to the international dimension, as 
well as to the role of the business sector and non-governmental organisations 
in society’s preparedness. Furthermore, greater emphasis is given to the role of 
the municipalities and the impact of the regional state administration reform. 
The revised strategy is to be adopted by the Government in December 2010 
and named the Security Strategy for Society.
The Security Strategy for Society is a Government policy document for 
ministries, dealing with how to manage preparedness-related matters in each 
administrative sector, what matters are of particular importance to society 
in terms of preparedness, the preparedness targets of each administrative 
sector, strategic tasks, and how to achieve them. Ministries are responsible for 
handling matters in their own administrative sectors, through legislative and 
other means and in such a way that the Government’s intentions, as expressed 
in the resolution, are fulfilled.
The Security Strategy for Society has been drawn up from the perspective of vital 
functions of society to be safeguarded under all circumstances. Such functions 
are intersectoral functional entities vital to society that must be secured at all 
times. The Security Strategy for Society describes these functions and defines 
their desired statuses. According to the Security Strategy for Society 2010, 
Finland’s vital functions are: 
 - Management of Government affairs
 - International activity
 - Finland’s defence capability
 - Internal security
 - Functioning of the economy and infrastructure
 - The population’s income security and capability to function
 - Psychological crisis resilience
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The security strategy also describes vital functions and threat models that 
endanger their continuity. The 2010 strategy includes thirteen threat models, 
instead of the previous nine. These threat models have been drawn up with 
the aim of taking better account of our society’s vulnerability. The models are 
intended to better serve the risk analysis work carried out within both the 
administration and the business sector. The threat models are:
 - Serious failure in power supply
 - Serious disruptions in telecommunications and information systems  
(cyber threats)
 - Serious disruptions in transport logistics
 - Serious disruptions in the community infrastructure
 - Serious disruptions in food supply
 - Serious disruptions in the financial and payment system
 - Liquidity problems in public finances
 - Serious disturbances in the health and wellbeing of the population
 - Major accidents, extreme forces of nature and environmental threats
 - Terrorism and other crime posing a threat to society
 - Serious disturbances in border security
 - Political, economic and military pressure
 - Use of military force
As the threat models indicate, the security of the state faces various threats 
which may involve non-military aspects. As a key objective, the state should 
therefore have the capability to respond, at a sufficiently early stage, to events 
influencing security and possible signs of such events. Securing vital functions 
is based on sufficient, long-term development of capabilities, their timely and 
flexible deployment, and the ability to harness capabilities already deployed.
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THREATS ON THE INDIVIDUAL, NATIONAL AND GLOBAL LEVELS 
SECURING THE FUNCTIONS VITAL TO SOCIETY
Individual
National
Global
Threats which primarily affect  
the earth and the future security  
of its population
Threats which primarily 
affect the state, society  
and population
Threats which 
primarily affect  
the individual
The citizen’s  
basic security
The security of the state, 
society and population
In order to render threat models more concrete, and in support of further threat 
analysis by various actors, the strategy identifies disruptions and disturbances, 
i.e. a threat or event endangering the security of society, its ability to function 
or citizens’ living conditions and security, at least momentarily or regionally. 
Disturbances may occur both under normal conditions and in an emergency 
situation. 
Disturbances occurring under normal conditions will be managed using the 
authorities’ normal statutory powers or resources. Systems and preparedness 
measures established under normal conditions create the foundation for action 
in an emergency situation. Similarly, arrangements created for emergency 
conditions can be utilised in managing disturbances under normal ones. 
However, managing a situation under emergency conditions may require 
additional powers or resources. More extensive or closer co-operation and 
communication between authorities and other actors is usually required for the 
management of such situations. Some types of disturbances may be related 
to several threat models, depending on the point of view, the source of threat, 
or its repercussions. For each of these disturbances, primary responsibility for 
preparedness has been assigned to a certain ministry.
Source: Ministry of Defence
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The Security Strategy for Society harmonises and co-ordinates preparedness in 
various administrative sectors. The strategy is aimed at avoiding overlaps when 
developing resources, while preventing a situation where capabilities necessary 
to securing functions vital to society are left undeveloped. In addition, the 
strategy is used in informing citizens about government-led measures taken 
to reinforce the security of society and the population. Moreover, the strategy 
functions as a way of mediating information for international co-operation 
partners, on the foundations of Finnish thinking and policy on security in 
society.
Jointly with the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness, the Security and Defence 
Committee is responsible for monitoring the Security Strategy for Society. 
These monitoring activities produce information for the Government on 
whether resources are properly allocated, in order to secure functions vital to 
society and to continuity in its functioning. In addition, monitoring enables the 
co-ordination of the strategy’s updating and development measures related to 
comprehensive defence. The Government decides on the strategy’s updating.
Through the Security Strategy for Society, preparedness of the ministries has 
been successfully harmonised and tools have been provided for risk management 
and contingency planning conducted by companies and municipalities. Several 
municipalities use the strategy in support of their contingency planning. For 
companies, the threat models outlined in the strategy provide a basis for 
risk analyses and business continuity planning. Among non-governmental 
organisations, for instance, the Finnish Red Cross and the National Defence 
Training Association of Finland utilise the strategy in planning and carrying out 
their activities. The core contents of defence courses are based on the Security 
Strategy for Society and the principle of comprehensive defence.
2.3 Government decision on the targets of security of supply 
Security of supply is guaranteed in Finland through an extensive co-operation 
network, encompassing various sectors of trade and industry, various 
administrative sectors and industry organisations. In Finland, there is a long 
tradition of partnership between the public and private sectors. Indeed, a great 
deal of preparation is based on co-operation between public authorities and 
the business sector, through voluntary agreements.  
Since the 1980s, the Government has regularly set general development 
objectives for security of supply. The latest Government decision on this was 
issued in 2008. According to the decision, the general objective is security of 
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supply based on the international markets. Preparedness measures secure 
infrastructure crucial to the functioning of society and the continuity of critical 
production in all situations.
The decision depicts the worst-case scenario for security of supply as a crisis 
situation in which the capability to produce critical articles and services, or obtain 
them from abroad, is temporarily disrupted. Other key threats endangering 
society’s economic functioning include disruptions in electronic information 
and communications systems, failures in energy supply, serious disturbances 
in citizens’ health and ability to function, as well as natural and environmental 
disasters. The level of security of supply will be dimensioned so that citizens’ 
living conditions and ability to function, as well as the functioning of society, 
can be maintained during serious disturbances under normal conditions and in 
emergency conditions, including in a state of defence.
The decision on the targets for security of supply defines focus areas for 
near-term development. These are divided into securing critical infrastructure 
(energy grids, ICT systems, transportation logistics, financial systems, water 
supply and other community infrastructure, construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure) and securing critical production (food supply, energy supply, 
health care, manufacturing supporting national defence, the export industry). 
Each category has been assigned individual, sector-specific targets.
2.4 Internal Security Programme
Internal security is a state of society in which everyone can enjoy the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the rule of law and a safe society, without fear 
or insecurity caused by crime, disruptions, accidents or any other phenomena 
arising in Finnish society or our increasingly globalised world. Internal security 
also involves preparing for major accidents, as well as other disruptions 
occurring under normal conditions.
The Internal Security Programme is a Government resolution specifying key 
priorities, objectives and measures for the intersectoral development of internal 
security. The Government issued a decision concerning the programme in 2004 
and 2008, with the latter setting the objective of Finland being the safest 
country in Europe by 2015. The programme deals with the following areas:
 - Improving safety in the home, during leisure time and when moving  
around
 - Improving the security of immigrants and ethnic minorities
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 - Reducing violence
 - Boosting competitiveness by improving business security
 - Preventing major accidents and disasters
 - Border security
 - Preventing illegal immigration and ensuring customs security
 - Preventing human trafficking and the related crime
 - Fighting organised crime
 - Preventing cybercrime and risks related to using the Internet
 - Combating terrorism, preventing illegal action by extremist movements 
 and violent radicalisation
The Internal Security Programme was prepared and is being implemented 
through broad-based co-operation between authorities at central, regional and 
local levels, and within non-governmental organisations and the business sector. 
A ministerial group on internal security steers the programme’s implementation 
and evaluates trends in internal security, including on a broader basis. The 
ministerial group will be assisted by the Internal Security Programme Steering 
Group in steering the programme’s implementation. 
The Internal Security Programme will be jointly implemented by the authorities, 
NGOs and the business sector. The authorities will ensure that the objectives 
defined in the programme are achieved and its measures implemented as 
part of normal operational and financial planning and performance guidance. 
The programme has strengthened co-operation between various actors and 
created a framework for co-operation enabling the intersectoral preparation 
and implementation of issues. Its implementation and results are monitored on 
a regular basis; the implementation of defined measures has largely proceeded 
as laid out in the programme.
3 Legislation on preparedness
Provisions concerning preparedness are divided into legislation on normal 
and emergency conditions. The authorities’ duty to prepare for emergency 
conditions is based on section 40 of the Emergency Powers Act (1080/1991). 
Under this provision, the Government, the state administrative authorities, 
state businesses and other state authorities, as well as municipalities shall 
ensure, by means of emergency plans, the prior preparation of emergency 
operations and other measures, that their duties are performed with minimum 
disruption, including in emergency conditions. Preparedness for emergency 
conditions is managed, supervised and co-ordinated by the Government and 
by each Ministry within its administrative sector.
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The purpose of the Emergency Powers Act is to secure the livelihood of the 
population and the national economy, to maintain legal order and constitutional 
and human rights, and to safeguard the territorial integrity and independence 
of Finland in emergency conditions. According to the Emergency Powers Act, 
the following constitute emergency conditions:
 - An armed attack against Finland, as well as war and the aftermath of war;
 - A serious violation of the territorial integrity of Finland and
 - the threat of war against the country;
 - War or a threat of war between foreign countries
 - and a serious international crisis implying the threat of war and requiring 
immediate action to increase Finland’s defensive readiness, as well as 
other specific conditions outside Finland but with a comparable effect, 
if they may pose a grave danger to the foundations of national living 
conditions and well-being referred to in section 1(1);
 - A serious threat to the livelihood of the population or the foundations of  
the national economy, brought about by the hampered or interrupted 
 import of indispensable fuels and other energy, raw materials and goods 
 or by a comparable serious disruption of international trade;
 - A catastrophe
However, the above-mentioned circumstances constitute emergency conditions 
only if the authorities cannot control the situation using regular powers.
The Government’s proposal for a new emergency powers act (HE 3/2008 vp) 
has been handled by Parliament, which opted to defer a decision until after 
the next parliamentary elections. The proposal concerns the enactment of a 
new emergency powers act, which would repeal the current act of the same 
name. This reform is aimed at bringing the Emergency Powers Act in line with 
the requirements of the Constitution. Furthermore, the purpose is to update 
the provisions on the authorities’ statutory powers in emergency conditions. 
The new law would change the decision-making procedure regarding the 
application of the Emergency Powers Act, such that the use of powers, as laid 
down in the Act, would be authorised by government decree rather than a 
presidential decree. Prior to issuing this provision, the Government must jointly 
declare with the President that emergency conditions prevail in the country. 
Parliament will take the final decision on the validity of the commissioning 
decree and how long it remains in force.
Only minor changes are proposed for provisions concerning preparedness 
under the Emergency Powers Act. It is proposed that preparedness duties be 
enacted under section 12 of the Act, in a similar way, content-wise, to section 
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40, subsection 1 of the Emergency Powers Act. According to section 13, 
concerning the management, supervision and co-ordination of preparedness, 
preparedness would be managed and supervised by the Government and each 
ministry within its own sector. Preparedness would also be co-ordinated by 
each ministry in its own sector. The new emergency powers act does not 
propose the co-ordination of preparedness by the Government, but only 
refers to other legislation, such as section 10, subsection 3 of the Government 
Rules of Procedure (the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries and the Meeting 
of Heads of Preparedness), and section 16, subsection 3 (co-ordination of 
comprehensive defence).
According to section 23 of the Constitution of Finland, necessary, provisional 
exceptions to basic rights and liberties, as provided for in legislation, are 
possible in the case of an armed attack against Finland, or in the case of an 
emergency that poses a threat to the nation and is, under law, considered as 
serious as an armed attack. Provisional exceptions such as those defined in 
section 23 of the Constitution of Finland must be compatible with Finland’s 
international human rights obligations. In its report on the constitutional 
reform of 2000, the Constitutional Law Committee states that the enactment 
of new, purely national laws deviating from the Constitution should be avoided, 
and exceptive acts should be resorted to only in highly exceptional cases and 
for compelling reasons.
In order to safeguard the independence of the state and maintain legal order, 
defence of the state can be rendered more efficient and security reinforced by 
declaring a state of defence by presidential decree and parliamentary consent 
(State of Defence Act 1083/1991). The presidential decree on declaring a state 
of defence can be issued for a certain period of time, not exceeding three 
months. It must mention the provisions to be implemented, and if they are not 
implemented nationally, their regional scope of application. The implementing 
decree must also be immediately submitted to Parliament for consideration. 
If Parliament so decides, the decree must be repealed. If the decree has not 
been submitted to Parliament within one week of its issuance, it shall lapse.
During a state of defence, the State of Defence Act (1083/1991) is in force 
alongside the Emergency Powers Act. The Emergency Powers Act will be 
applied only in so far as no other provisions have been issued in the State of 
Defence Act in case of war. The State of Defence Act is an exceptive act for 
times of crisis that regulates official powers when war is waged on Finland, and 
in violent internal conflicts with a serious impact on maintaining public order 
and aimed at repealing or changing the system of government as laid down in 
the Constitution.
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The Rescue Act (468/2003) lays down core obligations regarding planning and 
other preparedness activities in civil defence. Section 50 of the Rescue Act 
lays down provisions concerning preparedness in civil defence. Civil defence 
preparations conducted under normal conditions include planning and training 
for emergency conditions, construction of protective structures, maintenance 
of management, surveillance and alert systems and telecommunications, as 
well as preparing for evacuation, rescue operations, first aid, care for the 
population and clearance and cleaning activities. Specific powers exercised 
by the rescue services under emergency conditions are laid down in the 
Emergency Powers Act. The Government’s proposal for a new rescue act has 
been issued on 19 November 2010 (HE 257/2010 vp).
The purpose of the Security of Supply Act (1390/1992) is to safeguard economic 
functions and the related technical systems considered crucial to the livelihood 
of the population and the national economy and national defence (security 
of supply). General objectives for security of supply have been set in the 
Government’s decision (539/2008), defining the level of preparedness while 
taking account of the minimum needs of the population and the necessary 
trade and industry, as well as national defence.
Emergency conditions may necessitate resorting to exceptional measures as 
laid down in the State of Defence Act and Emergency Powers Act. In accordance 
with these Acts, under emergency conditions exports and imports may need 
to be regulated, production necessary for the defence of the state steered, 
transports and traffic monitored and regulated, temporary labour obligations 
issued and the population evacuated from areas where special military defence 
action is urgently required due to an attack or similar act.
4 Preparedness arrangements
4.1 Decision-making and co-operation between highest organs  
 of government
According to the Finnish constitution, the powers of the State in Finland are 
vested in the people, who are represented by Parliament. Legislative power is 
exercised by Parliament, which also decides on central government finances. 
The President and Government, whose members must have the confidence 
of Parliament, exercise governmental power. Judicial power is exercised 
by independent courts of law. The division of governmental duties and 
parliamentarianism also form a constitutional foundation for preparedness 
arrangements.
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Parliament monitors Government activities and policy in many ways. Tools for 
parliamentary control include interpellations, written parliamentary questions, 
parliamentary question times for oral questions, topical discussion, reports and 
communications and Prime Minister’s announcements. Ministers have the right 
to be present and speak during plenary sessions of Parliament.
In accordance with the Constitution, the President of the Republic takes 
decisions on the basis of motions proposed by the Government. If the President 
does not take a decision in accordance with the Government’s motion, the 
matter is returned to the Government for further preparation. The Government 
enacts the decision following its final approval by the President. The President 
of the Republic will accept the Government’s or a minister’s resignation upon 
request. The President may also dismiss any minister upon the Prime Minister’s 
proposal. Should the Government or any minister cease to enjoy the confidence 
of Parliament, the President is required to dismiss them without any request 
being presented to do so.
When the President of the Republic is prevented from carrying out his or her 
duties, these are assumed by the Prime Minister or, if the Prime Minister is also 
incapacitated, by the Minister acting as Deputy Prime Minister. The President 
decides on matters of war and peace, with the consent of Parliament. When 
necessary, the President issues a decree concerning statutory powers in 
accordance with the Emergency Powers Act and State of Defence Act. This 
decree is prepared and presented to the President by the ministry to which the 
introduction of such powers is most necessary to managing its administrative 
duties.  
As laid down in section 128 of the Constitution, the President of the Republic is 
the Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces. The President makes decisions 
on military orders and military appointments as provided by an act (section 58). 
The President decides on matters related to military orders, referred to in section 
31, subsection 1 of the Act on the Defence Forces, upon their presentation by 
the Minister of Defence, and other military-order related matters upon their 
presentation by the Chief of Defence. On his or her own initiative, or upon a 
representation by the Minister of Defence, the President may refer a matter 
concerning a military order for consideration by a Presidential session of the 
Government. In such a case, the President will decide on the matter upon its 
presentation by the Minister of Defence, without seeking the Government’s 
opinion. The Chief of Defence is entitled to attend such sessions and express 
his or her views. With respect to military orders involving the Front Guard, the 
President takes decisions upon representations by the Minister of the Interior, 
in accordance with the Act on border guard administration.
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On 10 May 2010, the Ministry of Defence set up a working group tasked with the preparation 
of a proposal on new provisions concerning the decision-making procedure with respect to 
military orders, under the Act on the Defence Forces. The working group is to draw up its 
proposal, on amending the Act on the Defence Forces, in the form of a government proposal 
and submit its report on 31 March 2011 at the latest.
In accordance with section 93, subsection 1 of the Constitution, Finland’s 
foreign policy is managed by the President of the Republic in collaboration with 
the Government. Under subsection 2 of the same section, the Government is 
responsible for the national preparation of decisions to be made in the European 
Union and takes decisions on the related measures. Close co-operation 
between the President and Government is required for the management of 
foreign policy. In accordance with section 93, subsection 2 and sections 96 and 
97 of the Constitution, Parliament also participates in the national preparation 
of decisions to be made within the European Union, with the Grand Committee 
and Foreign Affairs Committee occupying the main role.  
The co-operation obligation, as prescribed under the division of powers 
concerning international affairs, requires that the President and Government 
provide each other with appropriate and timely information on matters relevant 
to foreign policy. When formulating Finland’s stance on foreign and security 
policy matters of moment within the European Union, the Government must 
closely co-operate with the President of the Republic, in order to ensure the 
uniformity and consistency of Finland’s foreign policy. The Constitutional Law 
Committee (PeVL 36/2006 vp) is of the opinion that the joint meeting of the 
President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy is a viable and appropriate forum for such co-operation. Co-operation 
practices vary, depending on the stage of preparation and importance of the 
matter. In matters of far-reaching significance, the President must consult 
the entire Government. In situations requiring urgent decisions, it may be 
sufficient for the President to contact the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and 
Security Policy or an individual minister, chiefly the Prime Minister, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, or another minister responsible for the preparation of the 
matter in question.
In accordance with section 65 of the Constitution of Finland, the Government 
has general authority in matters concerning governmental and administrative 
duties. In accordance with the principle of parliamentarianism, the Government 
must enjoy Parliament’s confidence. The Government contributes to decision-
making by the President of the Republic and presents recommendations to 
the President. As laid down in section 67 of the Constitution, matters under 
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the Government’s authority are decided on, either at plenary meetings of the 
Government or at the ministry in question. The Government comprises the 
Prime Minister and a requisite number of other ministers. These ministers are 
accountable to Parliament for their official actions. Each minister participating 
in the handling of a matter in Government is accountable for the decision, 
unless they have submitted a dissenting opinion for the record. 
A Government plenary session can be convened as necessary on every day of 
the year, at any time of the day. Members of the Government are responsible 
for keeping the other organs of government, Parliament and the President 
of the Republic, sufficiently informed on the handling and content of matters 
falling under their authority. Co-ordinated schedules for the preparation of 
decisions and decision-making form the backbone of co-operation between 
various organs of government. In exceptional situations, this schedule will 
be adjusted, while ensuring that all persons responsible have a genuine 
opportunity to familiarise themselves with the matter under consideration.
In accordance with section 66 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister leads 
the Government and oversees the co-ordination of the preparation and 
consideration of matters falling within the Government’s mandate. Each ministry 
is responsible for the preparation of matters within the Government’s mandate 
and the appropriate functioning of administration in its own administrative 
sector. Ministries are led by a minister. Responsibility for ensuring that each 
administration functions appropriately also covers the steering and monitoring 
of administration under the ministry in question. In this way, the parliamentary 
nature of ministerial administration extends downwards to lower administrative 
levels.
In practice, the Government has an established way of operating that ensures 
that all members of Government have the same verified information in all 
situations, as required to manage their tasks appropriately and bear ministerial 
responsibility. For sharing information, the Government also has other forms 
of co-operation, such as informal cabinet meetings, cabinet evening sessions 
and cabinet committees. Like her predecessors, the current Prime Minister has 
the group of government party chairmen, the Quartet, in support of decision-
making.
In accordance with the Government Act, section 23, the Government has 
cabinet committees for the preparation of foreign and security policy, European 
Union affairs, finances and economic policy. The members of these cabinet 
committees must be members of the Government. More detailed provisions on 
the duties and composition of cabinet committees are issued in a government 
47
decree. Each cabinet committee has prescribed duties, including during 
disturbances. As regards comprehensive security, all cabinet committees and 
informal cabinet meetings play a relevant role in steering the preparation of 
matters.
The Prime Minister chairs the informal cabinet meetings and cabinet evening 
sessions. They also convene at the Prime Minister’s invitation. The Prime 
Minister’s special adviser serves as secretary at these sessions. Each cabinet 
committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Cabinet committees have secretariats 
that operate under the guidance of the Chair. In practice, the secretariats are 
also steered by the ministries responsible for each sector. Secretariats are in a 
key position in convening cabinet committees, since they follow topical affairs 
and monitor the progress made in preparation processes. The secretariats 
put forward proposals on the need to convene. Cabinet committees meet at 
established times on a weekly basis.  
In practice, the meeting of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, as provided in section 24 of the 
Government Act, has become an important part of the preparation of matters 
falling under the sphere of foreign and security policy.
4.2 Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
The duties of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy are 
defined in section 25 of the Government Rules of Procedure (VNOS 262/2003). 
According to this provision, the committee prepares important matters related 
to foreign and security policy and other matters concerning Finland’s relations 
with other states, as well as related internal security matters and important 
matters pertaining to comprehensive defence. The committee also handles 
issues related to the co-ordination of matters falling within its mandate.
The committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its other members are the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, a minister designated by the Government to handle 
matters falling within the mandate of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the 
Minister of Defence, and a maximum of four other ministers designated by the 
Government. The Minister of the Interior attends meetings of the committee 
when the matters at hand concern issues within his or her mandate. Any other 
minister may also take part in the consideration of a matter by the committee, 
when issues within his or her mandate are involved.
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Joint meetings of the President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee on 
Foreign and Security Policy have become regular practice. When the President 
attends, he or she chairs the meeting. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs serves 
as the committee’s secretariat. In addition, the Director of Government 
Communications attends meetings of the committee and provides information 
on decisions taken in line with instructions from the Prime Minister. 
The committee convenes once or twice a month, usually on Fridays after 
the meeting of the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs and the 
presidential session. As the meetings deal with topical issues in foreign and 
security policy, the meeting agenda and schedules are not usually known far 
in advance. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for preparing foreign 
and security policy decisions, and plays a key role as the secretariat of the 
committee and in preparing the agenda. Handling of matters at committee 
meetings is based on memorandums drawn up by responsible ministries. The 
Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy has also organised seminars 
related to the preparation of certain themes.
4.3 Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs
The duties of the Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs are defined 
in section 26 of the Government Rules of Procedure (VNOS 262/2003). The 
committee is chaired by the Prime Minister. Its members include the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister for Foreign Trade and 
Development, the Minister of Economic Affairs, the Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry and three other ministers, two of whom are designated by the 
Government, while the third is the minister under whose mandate the matter 
in hand falls. If necessary, the Government may designate a further minister 
as a member of the committee. All the other ministers may also take part in 
meetings of the committee.
 A matter is presented to the committee by the minister within whose mandate 
the matter lies. The Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs prepares 
matters to be decided within the European Union and brought to the committee 
by either the Prime Minister or the minister under whose mandate the matter 
in hand falls, or if the matter’s consideration by the committee is otherwise 
considered appropriate.
Secretarial services for the committee are provided by the Government 
Secretariat for EU Affairs. Minutes are taken of the meetings. In so far as the 
matter is not considered by the Government and is not confidential, these 
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minutes are immediately made public. In addition, the Director of Government 
Communications attends meetings of the Cabinet Committee on European 
Union Affairs and provides information on decisions taken, in line with 
instructions from the Prime Minister.
In addition to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the 
Cabinet Committee on European Union Affairs, the Government has two other 
statutory cabinet committees, the Cabinet Finance Committee and the Cabinet 
Committee on Economic Policy. The Cabinet Finance Committee is tasked 
with exercising advance financial control. The committee prepares matters 
of notable economic significance or which otherwise require the opinion of 
the Cabinet Finance Committee. The Cabinet Committee on Economic Policy 
handles matters related to overall economic development and economic policy, 
the main development outlines of the public finances and other issues requiring 
economic policy measures, as decided by the Prime Minister.
4.4 Preparedness by central government
Finland has a long tradition of preparing for disturbances and emergency 
conditions. Over the decades, through co-operation between authorities and 
companies, systems of preparedness and response capabilities have been 
created that are versatile and well-functioning, even on an international 
scale. Nevertheless, the structures and systems within our society’s operating 
environment have undergone significant changes in recent decades. As the 
scope of public administration has reduced, many tasks previously handled 
by the authorities have shifted to companies and state-owned companies that 
base their operations on economic principles.  Moreover, nearly all functions 
of society increasingly depend on functioning energy systems, as well as 
telecommunications and information systems. Consequently, such changes 
pose new challenges to preparedness in society.
There have been constant changes in the international operating environment. 
However, networking with other states and Finland’s stronger international 
position have increased our preparedness opportunities. Preparedness now 
encompasses new ways of operating. At the same time, the internationalisation 
of business has resulted in weaker self-sufficiency in some respects, as many 
functions important to security of supply, as well as material stocks, have 
moved beyond Finland’s borders.
Preparedness arrangements for emergency conditions will be based, as closely 
as possible, on functions and the division of powers under normal conditions. 
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As noted in chapter three, preparedness for emergency conditions is managed, 
supervised and co-ordinated by the Government and each ministry in their 
respective administrative sectors, in accordance with the Emergency Powers 
Act. At each ministry, the permanent secretary, assisted by the head of 
preparedness, is responsible for preparedness within the administrative sector 
in question. Elsewhere in central government, the director general or the head 
of institute bears the main responsibility for ensuring a well-functioning agency 
or institute.
For co-ordinating the ministries’ preparedness for emergency conditions, 
ministry officials who have been designated heads of preparedness convene 
regularly in a Meeting of Heads of Preparedness. These meetings are chaired by 
the Director of Government Security from the Prime Minister’s Office. Meetings 
concerning central government crisis management are chaired by the head of 
preparedness of the ministry within whose mandate the matters related to the 
situation’s management mainly fall (competent ministry). 
In addition to the Security and Defence Committee secretariat, the core of the 
secretariat of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness comprises representatives 
of the Prime Minister’s Office, Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, who manage this task alongside their own duties. In addition 
to the aforementioned, a broader composition of the secretariat includes the 
preparedness secretaries from all ministries, who manage the task alongside 
their own duties. Officials from various ministries who are members of the 
secretariat serve as experts in their respective administrative sectors and as 
contact persons for matters discussed in the meetings. 
At the moment, co-operation between the Meeting of the Heads of Preparedness 
and the Security and Defence Committee, in monitoring the Security Strategy 
for Society and in preparedness and the planning of exercises, is based on 
the Security and Defence Committee secretariat also forming the core of 
the meeting secretariat. Until now, the Chair of the Meeting of Heads of 
Preparedness has presented matters covered at the Meeting of Permanent 
Secretaries, but not those covered at meetings of the Security and Defence 
Committee. This procedure has been in line with the meeting practices of 
the Security and Defence Committee, because committee members present 
matters at committee meetings, naturally with the help of the relevant experts. 
Threat management requires the application of procedures that are familiar to 
and practiced by all actors involved in preparedness and the management of 
disturbances. The Strategy for Securing the Functions Vital to Society of 2006 
described the central government crisis management model for the first time. 
In conjunction with the 2010 Security Strategy for Society, the development 
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of crisis management has been under discussion and experiences gained from 
activities and exercises have been analysed. National organisations, whose 
activities focus on preparedness, must be more closely involved in the planning 
of national preparedness and operational exercises.
Situation awareness is a key area for future development. The Government 
needs to obtain situational information rapidly. Furthermore, competent 
authorities at various administrative levels require better situation awareness 
in support of their activities. At the same time, preconditions must be created 
for supporting various organisations and the business sector. Situations will 
be managed proactively and sufficient resources employed immediately. 
At Government level, when necessary the competent ministry will manage 
activities and co-operation between ministries. The competent authority will 
manage operational activities. Intersectoral co-operative bodies will support 
the competent authority. 
4.5 Preparedness at regional level
In recent decades, regional state administration has been under constant 
reform, rendering co-operation between various actors and the development 
of preparedness more difficult. As the regional administration reform took 
effect in 2010, new regional state administrative agencies (AVI) and centres 
for economic development, transport and the environment (ELY) were 
established. These agencies and centres occupy a key position in preparedness 
activities at the level of regional administration. There are six regional state 
administrative agencies in mainland Finland, handling tasks related to permits, 
supervision and legal protection that previously belonged to the state provincial 
offices, regional environmental centres and occupational safety and health 
inspectorates. Some services were transferred to the ELY Centres, established 
at the same time. 
The regional state administrative agencies promote the implementation of 
basic rights and legal protection, access to basic public services, environmental 
protection, environmental sustainability, public safety and a safe and healthy 
living and working environment in their respective regions. These agencies are 
responsible for the co-ordination of preparedness in the regions. They also 
arrange the related co-operation, co-ordinate contingency planning, organise 
regional defence courses, support the municipalities’ contingency planning, 
arrange preparedness exercises and promote security planning in regional and 
local administration. Steering of various sectors within regional administration 
is the responsibility of the respective ministries.
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Head offices
Branch offices
Decisions on staff working 
in branch offices are made 
by the regional state 
administrative agency.
Regional state administrative agencies
Head and branch offices
Vaasa
Oulu
Rovaniemi
Kuopio
Jyväskylä
Tampere
Joensuu
Mikkeli
Kouvola
Turku
Hämeenlinna
Helsinki
Regional state administrative agencies
Regional State Administrative Agency for Southern Finland
Regional State Administrative Agency for Southwestern 
Finland
Regional State Administrative Agency for Eastern Finland
Regional State Administrative Agency for Western 
and Inland Finland
Regional State Administrative Agency for Northern Finland
Regional State Administrative Agency for Lapland
The State Department of Åland operates 
in the autonomous region of Åland.
Source: Ministry of Finance 
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Centres for Economic Development, 
Transport and the Environment
Head and branch offices
Regional division
15 regions of operation
Lapland
Kainuu
North Karelia
Ostrobothnia and Central Ostrobothnia
South Ostrobothnia
Central Finland
North Savo
North Karelia
South Savo
Pirkanmaa
Satakunta
Southwest Finland
South Karelia and Kymenlaakso
Kanta-Häme and Päijät-Häme
Uusimaa and East Uusimaa
All three main areas of responsibility
Business and industry, labour force,  
competence and cultural activities; the  
environment and natural resources;  
and the required number of services  
in the transport and infrastructure  
area of responsibility
Business and industry, labour  
force, competence and  
cultural activities area of  
responsibility and the  
required number of services  
in the transport and infras-
tructure area of responsibility
Branch office
Head office
Further division in regions
9 operational regions
1. Lapland
2. North Ostrobothnia, Kainuu
3. South Ostrobothnia 
Ostrobothnia 
Central Ostrobothnia
4. Central Finland
5. North Savo 
North Karelia 
South Savo
6. Pirkanmaa
7. Satakunta 
Southwest Finland
8. South Karelia, Kymenlaakso
9. Uusimaa, East Uusimaa, 
Kanta-Häme, Päijät-Häme
Rovaniemi
Kemi
Oulu
Ylivieska
Kajaani
Kokkola
Vaasa
Seinäjoki
Kuopio
Jyväskylä
Joensuu
Pori Tampere Mikkeli
Hämeenlinna
Lahti
Kouvola
Lappeenranta
Turku
Helsinki
Source: ELY Centres, communications services
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Regional state administrative agencies provide expert assistance to 
municipalities in matters related to preparedness and the municipality’s 
contingency planning. In addition, the regional state administrative agencies 
support the competent authorities and, when necessary, co-ordinate their 
activities when the authorities are managing security situations in the region. 
In order to promote regional preparedness, regional preparedness committees, 
led by the director-generals of the regional state administrative agencies, have 
been established. These committees have wide representation from all key 
actors in the region and the regional administration. Such actors include the 
municipalities, the police and rescue services, the Border Guard, the Defence 
Forces, the hospital districts, the emergency response centres and various 
organisations, such as the Finnish Red Cross. 
The regional administration reform and its impact on preparedness activities by the 
Finnish Red Cross
The organisation’s opportunities for co-operation with the regional state administrative 
agencies and ELY Centres are only beginning to take shape. It is therefore hoped that the 
transitional period of regional administration reform will soon be brought to a conclusion, 
with good practices continuing as soon as possible.
The Red Cross has continued its co-operation, initiated when the provinces still existed, on 
preparedness committees and working groups. The preparedness committee provides a viable 
opportunity for organisations to exchange preparedness-related information with various 
actors. Genuine interest by the authorities in working group co-operation with the Red Cross 
is viewed very positively; it is hoped that this will strengthen, despite structural changes.
The regional aspect is emphasised in contingency and security planning conducted in co-
operation between NGOs and authorities. The boundaries of Red Cross districts currently 
encompass different municipalities to regional boundaries, for instance. As a result of the 
regional-level aggregation of key authorities, such as the police and rescue services, in the 
planning of preparedness activities the districts’ operational areas do not enable efficient 
co-operation with the authorities.
In future, volunteers’ activities in support of authorities should be made official by means 
of written contracts. In this way, issues such as personnel changes would not endanger the 
position of volunteers in preparedness activities.
Under normal conditions, the preparedness committee is responsible for co-
ordinating regional contingency planning between various authorities. Co-
ordination of preparedness should be based on risk analyses, drawn up for 
each region, and threat assessments of accidents. During disturbances and 
emergency conditions, the preparedness committees can be convened to 
discuss the resolution of the crisis or disturbance. Nevertheless, the regional 
administrative authorities have no role in crisis management itself, with the 
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exception of the previously mentioned co-ordination task and some other 
duties under their responsibility, as laid down in special legislation. Regional 
state administrative agencies transmit information in support of operative, 
political and administrative decision-making by the municipalities, regional 
administration, other central government functions of the ministries and 
competent authorities within the region.
There are 15 ELY Centres, and their tasks consist of those of the former 
employment and economic centres, regional environmental centres, road 
districts and the transport departments and the departments for education 
and culture in the state provincial offices, as well as the functions of the Finnish 
Maritime Administration. Within their regions, ELY Centres are responsible 
for implementation and development tasks related to the environment 
and natural resources, transport and infrastructure, business and industry 
(including agriculture), use of labour, immigration, education and culture, on 
behalf of the respective ministries. ELY Centres are also responsible for the 
related preparedness and crisis management. The director of the ELY Centre 
is assisted by a person co-ordinating preparedness planning (preparedness 
secretary). The ELY Centre for Uusimaa hosts a joint head of preparedness for 
ELY Centres, who provides expert assistance to the other centres and ensures 
that their preparedness activities are managed efficiently and in line with the 
relevant standards.
4.6 Preparedness at municipal level
As laid down in the Constitution, Finland is divided into municipalities, whose 
administration is based on self-government by their residents. In the beginning 
of 2010, Finland had 342 municipalities, out of which 326 were in mainland 
Finland and 16 in the Åland Islands. Municipalities provide basic services 
to their residents. The most important services are social and health care, 
education and cultural services, and environmental protection and technical 
infrastructure. In local government, the municipalities occupy a key position 
in preparedness and the management of disturbances. This is because, under 
normal conditions too, municipalities bear the main responsibility for the 
organisation of basic services and other functions vital to society.
In accordance with the Emergency Powers Act, municipalities must ensure, 
by means of emergency plans, prior preparation of emergency operations and 
other measures, that their duties are performed with minimum disruption, 
including in emergency conditions. This is based on preparedness forming part 
of normal activities. Actors responsible for preparedness and the management 
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of disturbances are also responsible for managing the municipality’s obligations 
and operations and ensuring the continuity of operations. The Emergency 
Powers Act also contains provisions that allow for exceptions, issued by a 
Government decree, to some obligations laid down in the Municipality Act, 
such as postponing municipal elections or transferring decision-making power 
from the municipal council to the municipal executive board. 
STEERING RELATIONSHIPS AND THE FLOW OF INFORMATION BETWEEN CENTRAL, 
REGIONAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN VARIOUS SECURITY SITUATIONS
Central administration
Situational information
Steering
Situational  
information  
and interaction
Necessary  
steering
Regional administration
Situational information  
and interaction Support
Competent authorities in local administration
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
The level of preparedness within municipalities varies greatly. Some have up-
to-date, well-prepared emergency plans. Preparedness of municipalities is led 
by municipal managers alongside the municipal executive board, as laid down 
in legislation. Should disturbances arise, the municipal manager is responsible 
for arranging co-operation in support of the competent authority, as well as for 
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managing the operations as a whole and securing financial resources within 
the municipality’s area. Co-operation between leading municipal officials is 
usually organised by way of a management group, which also forms the core 
of the basic organisation for preparedness and disturbance management. 
The management group is not an organ in the same sense as defined in the 
Local Government Act, but is responsible for co-ordinating the preparation 
and implementation of matters. In the case of disturbances, the management 
group supports action by competent authorities, using resources controlled by 
the municipality.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANISATION
Local council and other organs consisting of senior elected officials
Normal duties. Role is emphasised in long-term crises.
Municipal manager
Is responsible for the overall management of the situation, 
co-operation between competent authorities, arrangement 
of financial resources and participation of senior elected 
officials.
Management group
Co-operation organ of competent 
authorities. Other specialists may be 
invited (e.g. police).
Local competent authorities 
Each authority is responsible for the management of the situation within its own 
mandate. 
Source: Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities
Rescue services are municipal safety organisations. As the current Rescue 
Act became effective in 2004, the rescue services system maintained by 
municipalities changed from a service organised by individual municipalities 
to a regional system, with the country divided into 22 rescue service regions. 
In addition to the rescue authorities, the social and health authorities and 
environmental health authorities number among the important competent 
authorities in various disturbance situations.
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With respect to the preparedness of municipalities, and in a wider sense, their 
security management as a whole, factors to be taken into account include 
various new trends in local government and services, such as changes 
in municipal and service structures and in municipal service provision. 
Municipalities are becoming larger in size, while the number of municipalities is 
decreasing. As a result of the Restructuring of Local Government and Services 
Project (PARAS), the service structure of municipalities is changing, with 
service duties being transferred from individual municipalities for joint handling 
by several municipalities. Service provision is also organised into companies or 
transferred entirely to private operators. This will result in a decrease in service 
provision under the direct control of individual municipalities. Consequently, 
individual municipalities will have fewer opportunities for direct control over 
the management of disturbance situations. Preparedness for them will be 
on a weaker footing, since each service provider is responsible for its own 
preparedness.
For their part, the municipalities also attend to the general safety of their 
residents. Security in municipalities comprises several factors and aspects. In 
addition to municipal emergency plans and ensuring undisturbed continuity of 
operations, the aim is to provide living conditions based on which municipality 
residents feel secure. Furthermore, co-operation networks at local level, 
which, in addition to municipal actors, involve regional state authorities, 
congregations, educational institutions and representatives of the business 
sector and organisations participating in local government service provision, 
play their own role in creating safety and managing disturbances.
4.7 Situation awareness 
Reliable situation awareness, the competent authority’s understanding of what 
happened and factors that influenced the event, and an assessment of possible 
alternative developments in the situation, are an absolute prerequisite for 
decision-making and the management of a situation. The competent authority 
bears operational responsibility for the management of the situation, while the 
state leadership must be informed at a sufficiently early stage. In a networked, 
globalised society, it is essential to obtain information on the surroundings, 
what is happening and how this influences our own activities. Decision-makers 
at all levels must possess analysis-based, verified and appropriate situation 
awareness, or a situation picture, since they are expected to swiftly provide 
statements and bear political responsibility.
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Situation awareness is one of the key foundations of decision-making at all 
levels of management. For more extensive international operations and for 
the Government to carry out its general foreign and security policy duties, it is 
important that operational authorities provide the state leadership with rapid 
and sufficient information on the situation and measures taken. Situational 
information obtained by the Government does not entail that it will interfere 
with operational activities. The Government may, in turn, hold information 
on foreign and security policy, for instance, that has not been available to 
operational management. For this reason, the flow of information from the 
Government to the authorities is also important.
Security Strategy for Society 2010:
Appropriate and rapid situation awareness, based on correct information and assessments, 
is emphasised during disturbances when decisions must be taken which may have a very 
broad impact.
According to the Security Strategy for Society, the Prime Minister’s Office is 
tasked with maintaining the situation awareness of the Government. In line 
with its assignment, the Prime Minister’s Office compiles an anticipatory, 
real-time situation picture to support decision-making and communications 
by the Government and to increase situation awareness on issues related to 
the security of the state and society. The Prime Minister’s Office combines 
information from various administrative sectors and reports to the Government 
on this basis. However, this procedure has not abolished the responsibility of 
ministries and ministers to inform the state leadership in matters related to 
their respective administrative sectors. 
Situation awareness activities at governmental level began in 2003, on the 
basis of a Government resolution on the Strategy for Securing the Functions 
Vital to Society. In early 2005, the first situation awareness co-ordinator began 
to organise the collection of information from various ministries and authorities 
and to co-ordinate co-operation between different ministries, mainly the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, 
for drawing up reviews on matters important to the security of the Finnish 
state and society. A monthly thematic report on topical security issues gathers 
information and assessments from various security authorities into a thematic 
entity, including key conclusions. These reports are primarily produced for the 
Prime Minister, President of the Republic, members of the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign and Security Policy and the Minister of the Interior. 
60
For the continuous provision of information to the Government and the 
authorities, a Government Situation Centre was established in September 
2007. On call around the clock, in its current form the Centre employs eight 
people. The Government Situation Centre is also responsible for alerting the 
Government, permanent secretaries and heads of preparedness, and convening 
sessions, meetings and negotiations held at unusual hours on account of 
disturbances or crises. In addition, the Situation Centres serves members of 
the Government in matters related to close protection.
During the last two years, international contact point functions have been 
centralised in the Situation Centre. These functions are arranged on the basis 
of international agreements imposing obligations upon Finland (EU, UN, NATO) 
and on that of contractual decisions of the Council of the European Union, 
according to which Finland must arrange an alert and service point that fulfils 
international requirements, and from which necessary measures to provide 
and receive assistance can be initiated. The Government Situation Centre 
currently functions as Finland’s national contact point for information exchange 
under the EU’s crisis co-ordination arrangements, and under emergency 
service and certain NATO and UN alert arrangements. The transfer of civilian 
crisis management alert and on-call duties in Finland, to the Government 
Situation Centre, has already been decided on alongside the internal affairs 
administration. This project will be completed during 2011.
In recent years, the Government’s centralised information-sharing and situation 
awareness activities have been under development. There has been a need for 
the ministries and authorities to enhance the compilation and sharing of the 
situation picture within their own administrative sector and field of operations. 
This may have led to partially overlapping work in various situation centres. 
Each ministry develops its situation awareness activities from the perspective 
of management of its own administrative sector, while taking account of the 
needs of the Government’s common situation picture. For this reason, these 
activities as a whole are not managed in the most appropriate way.
Thematic reporting to the Government has been criticised on account of failing 
to provide sufficiently justified conclusions or any assessment of impacts on 
Finland’s security. The reports are compiled from material produced by various 
administrative sectors, for the purpose of thematic reporting. This material 
contains information that has already been transmitted by the ministry or 
agency in their own reports within their own organisations, and to interest 
groups. The core information in the thematic report is therefore already known 
to some recipients, for whom the reporting does not bring sufficient added 
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value. The content, choice of topics and co-ordination of anticipatory reports 
thus require further development.  
4.8 Communications
The communication capability of authorities therefore requires the planning 
of their own arrangements, reserving and training personnel and making 
co-operation arrangements. Emergency plans must include sector-specific 
communications plans covering disturbances and emergency conditions. 
Among other issues, this plan must define the communications responsibilities 
of authorities, exceptional channels and means of communication, and contacts 
with the mass media and other key stakeholders. 
The media industry and communications are undergoing a transitional phase, 
stemming from technological advances and the global reach of the Internet. 
While the Internet has turned the media global, it has also facilitated the 
dissemination of disinformation. The information society provides citizens with 
many opportunities to have an influence in crisis situations. However, easy 
and rapid sharing of information also poses a risk, since flawed or harmful 
information can be disseminated through social media, for instance. For this 
reason, from the point of view of the authorities as well as various companies 
and communities, it is important to strengthen and support official channels of 
information as a way of disseminating accurate information.
Particularly in the early stages of a crisis situation, the reliability of news is 
essential. Radio, television (especially the teletext service) and the Internet 
occupy the most important position in early-stage communications. As the crisis 
continues, the extent of information provided becomes more significant, since 
it can be obtained from various sources. Moreover, it is important to be familiar 
with media-use habits among citizens. The perceived importance of electronic 
news sources varies according to the time of day or the day in question, as 
the broadcast schedule has been designed to fit everyday routines. In terms 
of time and location, the Internet and mobile connections are more flexible. 
However, great differences in their use remain between population groups. 
Continuous effort is being put into narrowing these gaps. In a prolonged crisis, 
the importance of continuity in communication increases.
The Finnish Broadcasting Corporation YLE is under a statutory obligation to 
transmit public notifications by the authorities, further specified by decree, and 
to be prepared to run television and radio broadcasts in emergency conditions. 
In accordance with the Act on Radio and Television Operations (744/1998), 
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broadcasters are obliged to transmit notifications from the authorities, of 
which the entire population or residents of a specific area need to be rapidly 
informed. Such information must be published as such, without delay, in the 
online publication or programme in question.
Through contingency planning and preparedness for emergency conditions, 
television and radio broadcasters must ensure that their operations 
continue with as little disruption as possible, in both emergency situations 
and disturbances under normal conditions, as laid down in the Emergency 
Powers Act (1080/1991). In addition, television and radio broadcasters are 
also obliged to transmit information from the authorities to the public free 
of charge, if so deemed necessary in order to save human life or protect 
property, or to safeguard the functioning of society. More specific provisions 
can be issued by government decree. Such provisions may concern television 
and radio broadcasting operations necessary to saving human life, or for the 
management or security of society, or to ensure the operational capability of 
the business sector.
Not all population groups can be extensively reached through radio or television; 
for this reason, other electronic media are required in crisis communications. 
For instance, issuing an alert at night is a special problem that the media 
are unable to address. Instead, various media can jointly provide preliminary 
information through extensive coverage. Reaching and informing the growing 
number of people with a foreign background is a challenge.
Many different kinds of media already exist for crisis communications 
purposes. For instance, the creation of an open-access citizen portal for crisis 
communications is already under way. With respect to natural disasters, the 
analysis of information on the catastrophe and mobile communications are 
being developed under the LUOVA project. The results are likely to be applicable 
in improving night time communications, for instance. In addition, informal 
communications by citizens through social media, among other channels, 
provides new opportunities for sharing information and experiences through 
services other than those of the traditional media. In working life, occupational 
health and safety organisations can provide assistance in informing the working 
community.
A more open procedure is required in security policy debate and for the 
preparation of documents guiding preparedness. In chapter 2.2 below, the 
committee proposes that the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy 
organise broad-based seminar-type events focusing on security policy topics. 
Such discussion could further open up security policy to the general public, 
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helping them to achieve a better understanding of the issue as a common 
cause.
4.9 Security of supply
Security of supply refers to the capability to maintain economic basic functions 
in society that are vital to safeguarding the livelihood of the population, the 
functioning and security of society and the material prerequisites of national 
defence during serious disturbances and emergency conditions. In Finland, 
an essential component in the concept of security of supply is the operational 
reliability of systems deemed critical to society. Finland’s geopolitical position, 
climate conditions, long distances and sparse population pose various 
challenges to our security of supply. Finnish security of supply activities are 
therefore rather advanced in comparison to other EU member states.
Finland has a well-developed national economy that forms the basis of security 
of supply. If the economy is balanced and competitive, security of supply rests 
on a strong foundation. From the perspective of society’s overall interests, 
security of supply is best established when economic and industrial policy 
measures support the safeguarding of the population’s livelihood, society’s 
ability to function and the basic requirements of national defence. Society 
is developed in a holistic and balanced manner, with economic, social and 
environmental measures supporting the enhancement of resilience towards 
disturbances and improvement of security of supply.
The Ministry of Employment and the Economy is responsible for the development 
of security of supply and co-ordination of the related preparedness measures. 
However, each ministry develops security of supply within its own sector. The 
National Emergency Supply Agency, established in 1993 for the centralised 
development and maintenance of security of supply, operates under the Ministry 
for Employment and the Economy. Within the Agency, there is a Council for 
Security of Supply, as well as clusters and pools that serve as permanent 
co-operation bodies in a similar way to a committee, handling the general 
task of steering, co-ordinating and monitoring preparedness in their own 
sectors. The Council for Security of Supply is responsible for the maintenance 
and development of contacts with key co-operation partners, monitoring the 
status and development of security of supply, and putting forth proposals for 
measures. Financing for the operations of the National Emergency Supply 
Agency and the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure is provided 
from the Security of Supply Fund, which is not included in the State budget. A 
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security of supply fee is levied in conjunction with energy taxes and credited 
to the Fund.
Various sectors’ dependence on technical systems has become an increasingly 
central factor in security of supply arrangements. International markets and 
networking are also of growing importance to national security of supply. 
However, because the market mechanism is insufficient to ensuring security 
of supply in all sectors, special measures are required. Some sectors vital 
to the functioning of society require legislation obliging companies to ensure 
the continuity of their operations. The prerequisites for the operations of 
companies providing services to the administration, security authorities and 
other companies, and which are deemed important in emergency conditions, 
must be ensured in all security situations. Key production factors to be secured 
include the energy transmission and distribution grids, ICT systems, transport 
logistics systems and water and food supply. As concerns health, the Finnish 
Red Cross Blood Service plays a key role in Finnish crisis preparedness.
National measures are still being taken to prepare for the most serious crises. 
Security of supply has placed more emphasis on strengthening and securing 
basic infrastructure, instead of stockpiling. This development is due to the 
transfer of a large part of public authorities’ duties to the business sector, 
as a result of privatisation. In Finland, private sector ownership of critical 
infrastructure is growing on a constant basis, having already reached around 
70–80%. Although Finland has a long tradition of public-private partnership, 
co-operation with the business sector needs to be constantly developed, in 
order to increase the opportunities for national steering.
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4.10 Psychological resilience to crisis 
Psychological resilience to crisis is maintained by means of social cohesion, 
communications, education, protection of cultural identity and heritage, spiritual 
activities, the will to defend the country and civic activities and collective 
responsibility which reinforces crisis resilience. Psychological resilience is 
expressed in the determination to defend the independence of the state and 
sustain the livelihood and security of the population under all circumstances. 
The build up of psychological crisis resilience begins at birth. Parenting, the 
school system and military service, for instance, play an important role in 
creating such resilience. The crisis resilience of society is therefore based on 
balanced individuals with good psychological tolerance of crises.
The growth of new media and the decrease in the use of traditional news and 
information channels pose new kinds of challenges in terms of maintaining 
and reinforcing both a sense of community and psychological crisis tolerance. 
Particularly in a crisis situation, there is a need to strike a balance between the 
correctness and reliability of information and the speed of communications. 
In a networked world, anyone can share information through social media. 
Nowadays, no one has hegemonic control over news. 
However, the sense of community is endangered by social exclusion and 
differentiation, as well as growing individualism, leading to an increasingly 
mosaic society. Consequently, trust in society is weakened. The lonelier people 
become, the weaker their resilience to crisis.
Reinforcing trust capital is essential in building people’s ability to tolerate and 
survive the emotional pressure created by security situations. There is often 
talk of social capital, with mutual trust at its core. This means that people trust 
each other, including people they do not know. Trust in other people increases 
the sense of security.
Trust is therefore connected to our basic sense of security. It is assumed that 
by strengthening social capital and social activities, citizens’ sense of security 
will also improve. For this reason, societal measures promoting voluntary 
activities in general, and civic activities related to preparedness in particular, 
are important to the ability to survive in a time of crisis. Moreover, securing 
continuity is important, since a sense of continuity creates a sense of security. 
In preparedness, continuity is based on a clear division of powers, well-
rehearsed operating models and trust in adhering to common principles.
Social capital often refers to social networks, co-operation, utilising resources 
together and co-ordinating activities. The concept is frequently used to explain 
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the success and well-being of societies, communities or individuals. For instance, 
social capital is considered to ease social interaction and improve the flow of 
information. In this way, it enhances the whole of society’s ability to function, 
democracy, the economy and administration. Social capital can therefore be 
seen as one of a nation’s success factors, expressed as the “community’s way 
of doing things”.
Corruption, its type and extent is one way of measuring social capital within 
society. In the Nordic countries there is little corruption, which indicates that 
normal market mechanisms and practices can be relied upon in economic 
activities. Indeed, safety networks provided by the welfare society have 
fostered general trust in the economy, which increases the ability to take risks, 
flexibility and innovativeness, and the maintenance of economic dynamism, 
thereby improving the country’s competitiveness. From the perspective of 
social cohesion and social capital in Finland, it is important that gaps in well-
being do not become too large. This means combating social exclusion and 
poverty, while promoting sustainable social development in general. 
The Nordic countries have also traditionally had an active civic society, where 
trust in one’s fellow citizens has had a clearly broader basis than elsewhere. 
In this way, they have been able to maintain general trust in society. However, 
a decrease has been detected in civic activity, participation and co-operation. 
This is weakening society’s social capital and, consequently, the prerequisites 
for common preparedness arrangements. Nevertheless, recent studies indicate 
that a new wave of volunteering is emerging, with a strong value base of 
collective responsibility and readiness to help. Crisis situations may rouse a 
latent sense of community among the population. This may be manifested 
through an exceptional sense of solidarity, such as the desire to help strangers 
by way of practical action. Therefore, even a latent sense of community may 
nurture the population’s psychological resilience to crisis. In any case, it is 
important that as many people as possible possess basic aid skills, such as 
completed first aid training, since such skills increase the readiness to respond 
and function, even in surprising situations.
The strengths of Finnish society and the characteristics of its administration 
form the foundation of preparedness. In accordance with the comprehensive 
defence approach, Finland has a low threshold for co-operation between actors 
in various sectors, and long traditions in, for instance, national defence, security 
of supply and crisis management, based on close co-operation between the 
public and private sectors. 
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5 International dimension of preparedness
5.1 The European Union
Membership of the European Union is integral to Finland’s security policy. 
Drawn up in 2008, the EU Report on the Implementation of the European 
Security Strategy takes note of new challenges, such as the information 
network and energy security, in various ways. The EU has issued a directive 
aimed at protecting European critical infrastructures (2008/114/EC), with 
the purpose of securing infrastructures serving at least two Member States. 
Furthermore, the directive aims at agreement on the procedures by which 
critical infrastructures can be identified and designated. 
The European Union is currently preparing a European Programme for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, in order to prevent and minimise the damage caused 
by infrastructure disturbances or failures. Finland is an active participant in the 
Programme’s implementation, since strengthening EU security is in Finland’s 
best interests. In addition, the EU is also preparing a programme to secure 
functions vital to society in Europe, whose purpose is to prevent and minimise 
disruptions and the resulting damage.
In accordance with the solidarity clause (SopS 66 and 67/2009) of the Lisbon 
Treaty (2009):
The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is 
the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall 
mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available 
by Member States.
A request for assistance can be presented by the political authorities of the 
Member State in question. In the implementation of the solidarity clause, 
mutual assistance between Member States refers to the provision of executive 
assistance across national borders, executed by any authorities of Member 
States acting according to the wishes of the Member State requesting 
assistance. Most functions are civilian, such as police and rescue missions, 
possibly supported by the deployment of soldiers or defence force equipment 
in an assistive role. As concerns civilian measures, and depending on the 
situation, the case may also involve sectors other than the Ministry of the 
Interior.
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With respect to civilian functions, the current legislation is thought to provide a 
firm foundation for implementing the solidarity clause. In providing assistance, 
various existing mechanisms based on bilateral or multilateral contractual co-
operation structures, and the co-ordination mechanisms created under EU 
auspices, can be utilised. These mechanisms facilitate efficient and flexible 
utilisation of resources already at the disposal of Member States, in cases 
requiring the application of the solidarity clause.
The Finnish Government has examined the prerequisites for implementing 
the solidarity clause. In addition, the Finnish Defence Forces are viewed as 
being well-prepared to assist other authorities in receiving foreign assistance 
and providing support to other countries, especially in Finland’s neighbouring 
areas. Furthermore, it has been recommended that, as part of preparedness 
arrangements, the organisation of leadership and the division of responsibilities 
be evaluated with reference, for example, to liability for damage. In terms of 
civilian operations, Finnish legislation provides for the provision of assistance, 
but the potential use of force in implementing the solidarity clause would 
require legislative changes in relation to police and border control authorities 
and the Defence Forces.
Under section 12 of the Act on the Defence Forces, a decision to provide 
assistance to another state is taken by the Ministry of Defence, upon the 
request of the competent Ministry, after consulting the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. If the project is extensive and an important principle is at stake, or if 
the significance of the matter otherwise requires, a decision on participation 
by the Defence Forces is taken by the Government in a general session. If 
providing such assistance is of major foreign policy importance, the decision 
is taken by the President of the Republic. The Defence Forces may provide 
assistance in the form of equipment, materials or expertise, but not military 
force.
The Government Security and Defence Policy Report 2009 states that Finland 
will act in accordance with the solidarity clause and establish the necessary 
capabilities to provide and receive assistance.
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In its report (UaVM 2/2006 vp), the Foreign Affairs Committee states the following:
“No artificial limitations or criteria should be imposed within the European Union with 
respect to the implementation of the solidarity clause; each situation should be assessed on a 
case-by-case basis.” Even if the clause’s practical implementation would chiefly comprise co-
operation between the rescue and police authorities, the Foreign Affairs Committee considers 
it important that all resources, military included, of Member States be made available for 
implementation of the clause. The committee also pointed out that the Union’s crisis and 
emergency co-ordination arrangements would be naturally suited to the implementation of 
the solidarity clause. Furthermore, the committee underlined that no overlapping structures 
should be established.”
Arrangements for the Union’s implementation of the solidarity clause are by a 
decision of the Council (TFEU 222 (3) article) acting on a joint proposal by the 
Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy.
The mutual assistance obligation included in the Lisbon Treaty aims to reinforce 
solidarity among Member States and bolster their commitment to developing 
the Common Security and Defence Policy.
The mutual assistance clause of the Lisbon Treaty (2009):
If a Member State falls victim to armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States 
have an obligation to aid and assist it by all means in their power, in accordance with 
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States. Commitments and co-operation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which 
are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its 
implementation.
The clause’s content, and its relationship to Finnish legislation, is addressed 
in detail in the Government Bill concerning approval of the Lisbon Treaty (HE 
23/2008 vp, p. 104, 105, 112, 113, 158 and 159), which states, among other 
things, that, from the Finnish point of view, the European Union’s obligation to 
provide mutual assistance is of great importance politically and as a matter of 
principle, while further enhancing the central role of the EU in Finnish security 
policy. 
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According to the Finnish view, the mutual assistance obligation is directly 
binding on the Member States, and its application does not require a decision 
at Union level. This obligation surrenders no authority to the Union, leaving it 
up to each Member State to decide on provision and forms of assistance. At 
EU level, no debate has been initiated on how the assistance obligation will be 
implemented, nor have Member States given much thought to the meaning 
of the mutual assistance clause. On the other hand, the fact reiterated in the 
Lisbon Treaty, that all Member States belonging to NATO (21) implement their 
collective defence under the auspices of NATO, has an influence on the issue. 
The European Union lacks common defence planning and structures.
Each Member State is responsible for achieving national preparedness for the 
obligation’s implementation. Under Finnish legislation, the implementation of 
the EU obligation of mutual assistance should be placed on an equal footing 
with any collective defence activity launched under Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. An exception to the rule would be situations in which the 
assistance obligation is applied to offensive measures other than those referred 
to in Article 51, or in which Finland decided to participate in implementing the 
assistance obligation by offering non-military assistance.
The EU Crisis Co-ordination Arrangements (CCA) have been designed for 
situations in which the crisis is so far-reaching, or of such political moment, 
that addressing it requires the co-ordination of EU measures. The CCA ensures 
the creation of common EU situation awareness and defines how EU bodies 
and Member States will co-operate in a situation in which two or more Member 
States are the object or victim of a disaster or emergency (including terrorism). 
After consultation with the Member State or States which have fallen victim to 
the crisis, the activation process is initiated by the holder of the EU Presidency. 
Operating under the European External Action Service is the EU SITCEN, a 
key organ of the CCA. In the above situations, information exchange with 
and between Member States is effected via the CCA website, maintained by 
SITCEN. This website can be activated at the onset of the crisis, even prior to 
the launch of the CCA system.
Various EU administrative sectors have alert systems, such as the Rapid Alert 
System for Food and Feed (RASFF) related to food safety, and the Rapid Alert 
System for Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks (RAS-BICHAT) regarding 
health-related risks.
Furthermore, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has an alert system known 
as the Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), 
which is managed by the EU Commission’s Monitoring and Information Centre 
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(MIC). Via this system, support and assistance can be requested from e.g. 
Member States, for civil protection tasks. The Commission has also developed 
a general European rapid alert system called ARGUS, intended for situations 
similar to those described under the CCA system above. In this matter, co-
operation is currently being developed between the Commission and the 
EU SITCEN. The EU is in the process of developing a Critical Infrastructure 
Warning and Information Network (CIWIN) for the purposes of the European 
Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection. Finland’s national point of 
contact for the CCA, CECIS and CIWIN systems is the Government’s situation 
awareness centre. 
The EU Political and Security Committee assembles twice a week and, if 
necessary, can be convened at short notice. A ‘Watch List’, a rough estimate 
of countries whose (security) development requires closer monitoring, is 
maintained by the EU.
5.2 Nordic countries
The Nordic Countries are involved in a form of official regional co-operation 
which ranks among the world’s oldest and most comprehensive. This political co-
operation is based on common values and the will to achieve results promoting 
dynamic development and enhancing the competence and competitiveness 
of the Nordic Countries. Nordic co-operation is regulated under a range of 
agreements concerning various sectors. A key agreement regulating the forms 
and organisation of co-operation is the Helsinki Agreement (SopS 28/1962), 
signed in March 1962, and amended on several occasions since then. This co-
operation agreement between Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark 
promotes close community between Nordic Countries, uniform regulation in 
as many sectors as possible, and the practical division of tasks between these 
countries.
Several ministries and other actors handling preparedness co-operate with 
other Nordic Countries over the related issues. For example, these countries 
have made agreements on arrangements concerning the pharmaceutical 
sector, securing the electricity transmission network, and co-operation in 
preventing the sea’s degradation by oil or other harmful agents. The ministers 
responsible for Nordic crisis readiness and civil protection signed the Haga 
Declaration and gave a joint statement in Stockholm in April 2009. Increasing 
co-operation over preparedness issues is an example of renewed interest in 
joint Nordic solutions. 
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This co-operation includes the following elements:
 - Rescue service on the basis of current Nordred co-operation;
 - Training and joint exercises, taking account of international exercises;
 - Preparedness in the event of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear 
disasters;
 - Crisis communication, with a special emphasis on informing Nordic citizens;
 - Use of volunteers in order to intensify the exchange of experiences and 
enhance  preparedness; and
 - Research and development focused on finding new co-operation partners.
The Nordic co-operation within the defence sector has deepened significantly 
in recent years. The Nordic Countries have taken the decision to develop and 
reorganise their mutual co-operation in such a manner that former, separate 
collaborative arrangements have been integrated into a single structure (Nordic 
Defence Co-operation, NORDEFCO). This rearrangement decision was taken at 
the end of 2009, when Finland was acting as chairman of Nordic Defence Co-
operation. Such co-operation covers defence policy and operations, and the 
development of military capabilities. Military co-operation will be developed 
within the Co-operation Areas of Strategic Development, Capabilities, HR and 
Education, Training and Exercises, and Operations. The implementation of new 
structures and forms of co-operation is presently under way. Although such 
co-operation will intensify in the long term, many minor concrete steps have 
already been taken.
5.3 NATO
In accordance with NATO’s Strategic Concept, the Alliance’s core tasks include 
collective defence, crisis management and the enhancement of international 
security. NATO has increasingly transformed itself into a broadly oriented, 
multilateral security policy and crisis management organisation. At the same 
time, its memberships and partnerships have expanded, now encompassing 
a network of over 60 countries. NATO has an impact in maintaining and 
promoting security and stability. While crisis management tasks have become 
increasingly important to NATO, collective defence remains at the core of 
the Alliance. Because the volume of crisis management operations is on the 
increase, the resources of NATO’s partner countries, including Finland and 
other potential co-operation partners, are needed in addition to those of the 
Alliance. At present, the biggest NATO operations are the crisis management 
operations in Afghanistan and Kosovo.
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NATO Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) is tasked with providing support for 
Article 5 operations, crisis management operations and national authorities of 
NATO Allies in the event of crisis or disaster, as well as co-operating with partner 
countries. Civil emergency preparedness falls under national jurisdiction. Via 
Civil Emergency Planning, NATO provides support for national planning, and 
aims to ensure that each country has the national preconditions and capabilities 
required to protect its citizens (for example, in the event of a strike using 
chemical or biological weapons). The purpose of NATO’s civil activities is, first 
and foremost, to support the core functions, i.e. the military dimension, of 
the Alliance. Wide-ranging threats impact on the importance of NATO Civil 
Emergency Planning, in accordance with the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept.
Traditionally, Civil Emergency Planning co-operation has been very open to 
partner countries. Finland has been an active participant in such co-operation in 
various sectors. In this way, Finland obtains knowledge of the practices followed 
by other countries and gains an opportunity for international networking. At 
the same time, Finland presents its own expertise in internal preparedness 
planning, putting it at the disposal of NATO and partner countries. Participation 
in such co-operation supports the development of national preparedness.
NATO has its own emergency rescue service for crisis situations (Euro-Atlantic 
Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre, EADRCC). In the event of a crisis 
or disaster, allies and partners can forward detailed requests for assistance 
via the EADRCC or North Atlantic Council (NAC), but the needs of allies are 
prioritised. Finland also participates in EADRCC’s multinational decision-making 
and field exercises. NATO has no centralised security of supply system or 
common supply security stockpiles.
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PART III: COMMITTEE’S KEY COMMENTS  
AND PROPOSALS
1 Enhancing proactive preparedness 
1.1 Development of co-operation on the basis of comprehensive security 
Part II of this report, above, describes the ways in which changes in the operating 
environment impact on the structures of the public authorities, business sector 
and society as a whole. It also calls for an examination of preparedness 
from the perspective of the comprehensive security concept. If, instead of 
‘comprehensive defence approach’, we discuss ‘comprehensive security’ on 
a broader scale, we will obtain a modern and more easily understandable 
approach to describing various kinds of threats and disruptions.  
For this reason, in its proposals, the committee uses the terms ‘comprehensive 
security’, ‘Security Committee’, and ‘Security Secretariat’. However, the current 
comprehensive defence approach, which the committee was assigned to 
review, still serves as an operating model. It refers to the involvement of the 
public and private sectors, as well as civil society, and the co-ordination of their 
preparedness-related functions in order to maintain functions vital to society 
under any circumstances. As a modus operandi, a comprehensive defence 
approach is progressive even in international terms. Among other things, this 
comprehensive defence approach is used to designate tasks for the Cabinet 
Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, and the division of labour between 
ministries. In using the term ‘comprehensive security’, the committee is not 
suggesting change in the basic elements of preparedness arrangements or in 
the co-ordination of comprehensive defence, currently part of the Ministry of 
Defence’s mandate.
 
However, as the operating environment changes, the current systems must 
be made more efficient and preparations must be made for new kinds of 
disruption that may be difficult to foresee. The purpose is to improve the 
resilience to crises of society as a whole. Only common resources are available 
to society. Depending on the severity of the crisis, their utilisation with the 
greatest possible efficiency can be described as ‘stepless control’ of resources.
The committee sees no significant shortcomings in the present preparedness 
system. Development measures therefore concern themselves more with 
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eliminating overlapping functions between authorities and creating the 
preconditions for enhanced co-operation. The committee has limited its 
proposals to what it unanimously deems necessary changes to the present 
system.
First and foremost, the committee is of the opinion that the currently authority-
centric approach should be rendered more transparent. In addition, better notice 
should be taken of the business sector’s enhanced role and the importance 
of various non-governmental organisations. In practice, various functions 
associated with preparedness – the maintenance of security of supply and 
operating conditions in the case of economic disturbances in particular – have 
been delegated to the increasingly international business sector. Psychological 
resilience in crises and the management of various issues at the level of society 
as a whole require greater emphasis on the civic perspective and voluntary 
activities. 
When developing preparedness and streamlining existing structures, we must 
therefore aim for ‘a Finnish model of comprehensive security and preparedness’. 
We need the most open security debate possible, since this would enhance 
general confidence levels. In the institutions responsible for preparedness 
arrangements, the public administration must increase its interaction with the 
private and business sectors and NGOs. These viewpoints of the committee 
have already been reflected in the project for updating the Strategy for 
Securing the Functions Vital to Society, involving a change in the name of the 
new resolution to ‘Security Strategy for Society’. 
1.2 Clarity in division of powers between authorities
When engaging in preparedness planning and taking the relevant action, it 
is essential that all of the parties involved follow society’s generally accepted 
principles. These include the foundations of democracy and rule of law; 
division of social responsibility and maintenance of the division of powers 
between authorities, even under exceptional circumstances; cost-efficiency; 
co-ordination of measures; and meeting international obligations.  
Management of affairs on the basis of normal powers is important, since it 
increases confidence in the exercise of public authority. Crisis leadership is 
based on the application of valid legislation, with each authority attending 
to its own duties. Responsibility for operative leadership therefore belongs 
to a competent authority, which requests executive assistance if necessary. 
In structural reforms to the public administration, insufficient attention has 
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been paid to clarity in the division of powers between authorities. In this 
respect, reforms to the regional state administration, and at municipal level in 
particular, have come to the fore in the studies conducted by the committee. 
The committee proposes that, as these reforms continue, the co-operation and 
co-ordination required for preparedness measures be increased.    
Another basic guideline of the committee is that there is no need to develop 
regulations on specific procedures or command systems for disruption 
situations. If specific provisions are laid down for each level of threat or 
disruption, regulations on the related procedures and command systems would 
also be necessary. Such regulations tend to cause interpretative difficulties and 
obscure the conventional division of responsibilities between authorities and 
preparedness arrangements. Intermediate state legislation is bound to render 
co-operation between administrative sectors more difficult. 
In accordance with this basic guideline, responsibility for preparedness belongs 
to the administrative sector under whose remit it normally falls. For instance, 
if there is uncertainty about which ministry’s mandate covers a certain issue, 
in accordance with section 2.3 below, the committee emphasises the Prime 
Minister’s status and co-ordination obligation. 
Emergency powers legislation is in place for emergency conditions. The new 
Emergency Powers Act (HE 3/2008 vp, EV 71/2010 vp), which Parliament has 
deferred until after the next parliamentary elections, would repeal the current 
Emergency Powers Act and update the provisions on the powers of various 
authorities. In addition, pursuant to section 23 of the Finnish Constitution, in 
emergency conditions there is provision for necessary, provisional exceptions 
to basic rights and liberties under an Act of Parliament. An amendment to 
section 23 of the Constitution was proposed in Government bill (HE 60/2010 
vp), submitted to Parliament in the spring of 2010. The Constitution does not 
provide for any other exceptions in emergency conditions. 
In accordance with both the current and proposed new Emergency Powers Act, 
emergency powers can be exercised only if the authorities are unable to control 
the situation by exercising normal powers. Even under these circumstances, 
the committee underscores the importance, in so far as possible, of maintaining 
a normal division of powers between authorities.  
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1.3 Access to information and situation awareness
Access to accurate information and reliable situation awareness are the 
preconditions for situation control and decision-making. Although the 
competent authority bears operative responsibility in each case, to control 
the overall situation national leaders require adequate information sufficiently 
early. Requirements concerning speed of communication have risen to a new 
level. The social media, network connections, and net forums also set further 
requirements on speed of communication, as well as on access to accurate and 
reliable information.
Drawing up reviews of topics of importance to the security of society and the 
state is also part of such activity. Since several other authorities and levels of 
regional administration also maintain their situation awareness, the committee 
has observed the need to render such activities more effective. 
The committee considers it important that situation awareness, analysis 
and reporting on security threats to society and the related preparedness, 
be rendered more efficient, paying special attention to the integration of 
information. With respect to the preparedness of society, management 
of disruptions forms a single entity alongside leadership arrangements in 
emergency situations. Situation awareness activity and its arrangement at 
various administrative levels form an integral part of preparedness for a crisis. 
The objective must be a cost-efficient crisis management system that fits 
naturally into the administrative sector’s normal activities and that is supported 
by situation awareness activity. 
In situation awareness activity and the related communication, it would be 
expedient and economical to build activities on organisations and situation 
awareness centres already involved in such work as part of their official duties, 
and possessing the required information. Foreign affairs, and interior and 
defence administrations’ expertise and needs should also be linked to further 
technical development of the Government’s situation awareness activity and 
the related arrangements. In this way, we can better respond to the challenges 
posed by potential emergency conditions and ensure co-operation between 
administrative sectors. The technical systems to be developed facilitate the 
dissemination of situation awareness information to various administrative 
levels and other actors, including the business sector and organisations. 
Stand-by readiness and point-of-alert activity, observing the needs of the Prime 
Minister and the Government, have been found necessary from the perspective 
of the Government and the President of the Republic. Analysis and reporting, 
directed at Government members, on security events of current interest require 
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further development. As the basis for a comprehensive analysis of security 
situations, information from all key sources should be integrated. This activity 
should include conclusions drawn on the basis of the comprehensive situation 
awareness analysis and an assessment of their impact on Finland’s security. 
The committee is of the opinion that potential overlaps in situation awareness 
activity should be identified and eliminated, where necessary. In doing so, the 
most rational and appropriate use of society’s resources should be ensured. Co-
operation has already begun between sectors involved in situation awareness 
activity, in information exchange and technical system development. Such 
collaboration should be further developed. In this way, overlaps in future 
arrangements can be prevented and full use can be made of all available 
resources.
The key goal in developing potential new situation awareness arrangements 
involving the national leadership must be that all situation awareness 
information is sufficiently comprehensive and integrated upon reaching said 
leadership.
Focusing on the present, situation awareness activity serves the needs of 
normal operative activities and crisis management decision-making. Foresight 
covering a longer time span and serving national leaders must be developed 
through, for example, increased co-operation between situation awareness 
activity and the Government’s foresight network. Such foresight must project 
forward over a period of more than a decade. In conjunction with this, we must 
also take account of the development of so-called horizon scanning activity.
The committee is of the view that the Security Committee, presented later in 
this report, should consider how best to arrange control of disruption situations 
and crisis management, as well as closely related situation awareness activities. 
Regional state administrative agencies are tasked with the co-ordination of 
regional preparedness measures and organising the related co-operation. 
The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, 
the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Defence should jointly and 
objectively examine the implications of the co-ordination obligation resting on 
regional state administrative agencies, with respect to the need to maintain 
regional situation awareness. Again, this should be done with due attention to 
resources, responsibility for costs and other authorities maintaining situation 
awareness in the region.
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The committee gave thought to the opportunities of the highest national 
leadership to obtain accurate, immediate information from the most senior 
security sector officials, in pursuit of comprehensive security. The committee 
deems appropriate the practice based on which meetings can be called at the 
behest of the highest national leaders. Such leaders include the President of the 
Republic and the Prime Minister. This involves the participation of leaders of the 
highest level with respect to so-called hard security, including Chief of Defence, 
Chief of the Finnish Border Guard, National Police Commissioner, Director of 
the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, Chief of Intelligence of the Defence 
Forces, and Director General of Department for Rescue Services, who can thus 
communicate their own views on situation awareness and preparedness. Such 
a procedure, which enhances communication and collaboration relationships, 
can improve our preparedness and prerequisites for coping with serious crises. 
These arrangements would not constitute the founding of a new agency.
2 Highest lines of authority and division of responsibilities  
in preparedness activity
2.1 Development of reporting procedure
Pursuant to section 44 of the Constitution, the Government may present 
a statement or report to Parliament on a matter related to the country’s 
governance or its international relations. No decision on confidence in the 
Government or a Government Member may be made during consideration 
of such a report. In other words, the report serves the Government’s need 
to place issues of importance to the country’s governance or international 
relations for consideration by Parliament, without reference to the issue of the 
confidence enjoyed by the Government (HE 1/1998 vp. p. 95; see also PeVL 
37/2006) in this relation. 
With respect to the public finances, a Government report submitted to Parliament 
refers to a process directed at the exceptionally long-term development of 
activities and a search for balance in terms of resources. In this way, savings 
in resources can be made and the security and defence policy can be distanced 
from topical political affairs. The five Government reports (1995, 1997, 2001, 
2004 and 2009) so far submitted have opened up a perspective extending 
beyond the government terms in question.
In its review work, the committee was to take note of the statements made 
in the Government Report on the Finnish Security and Defence Policy of 2009 
and during the course of Parliament’s consideration of said report. Firstly, on 
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the basis of these documents, the committee noted that notions vary on how 
well the Government report serves as a guideline document. While favourably 
disposed towards a comprehensive concept of security, the Parliamentary 
Foreign Affairs Committee viewed the report as unclear or rather general with 
regard to new and indirect threats. The Defence Committee pointed out that, 
when executed in accordance with the comprehensive concept of security, 
preparedness is problematic with respect to the Defence Forces’ development. 
The Administration Committee called for internal security to be treated on an 
equal basis with foreign and security policy. It also wished to see perspectives 
developed on civil crisis management.
Parliament has entertained diverse views on which committee should issue 
a statement on each particular Government report. While the Foreign Affairs 
Committee did so on the reports of 1995, 1997 and 2009, the Defence 
Committee commented on those of 2001 and 2004. Since the report of 2004, 
a Parliamentary Security Policy Monitoring Group, made up of Members of 
Parliament from various parties, has participated in the report’s preparation 
process. 
Since, upon a proposal by the Speaker’s Council and in accordance with its Rules 
of Procedure, Parliament decides on the committee to which each particular 
report should be submitted, and which committees should issue statements 
thereon, the committee cannot take a stand on this aspect of the procedure. 
Generally speaking, the committee considers the report a useful instrument, 
essential to laying down Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines. This 
reporting method bolsters the democratic system by which the highest state 
organ, Parliament, decides on the broad outlines of Finland’s security and 
defence policy.
Each report’s importance as a guideline document depends on its content. The 
committee’s basic stand on adopting a comprehensive approach to security, 
and preparing for new kinds of unpredictable threat and disturbance situations, 
entails extending the scope of the reports to include the examination of new 
types of security issue. In this way, the reports would provide a better basis, 
with parliamentary support, for drafting other guideline documents, primarily 
the Security Strategy for Society and the Internal Security Programme. 
This would also clarify the hierarchy between these lower-level guidance 
instruments. Upon extending its scope, the report’s preparation process also 
requires further development.
The current system, according to which the Government Report on Security 
and Defence Policy is prepared every four years, is too inflexible in accounting 
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for changes in the operating environment and the emergence of unexpected 
threat scenarios. The committee therefore proposes that the reporting practice 
be developed, by setting a clearly target-based schedule for each report’s 
drafting process. In addition, the reporting procedure should be streamlined 
so that, if necessary, the report can be complemented with a new report, 
narrower or broader in scope in accordance with the circumstances.
Even in this case, based on a report by the relevant committee, Parliament will 
determine the statement to be issued on the complementary report. Depending 
on the report’s scope and content, the handling procedure could be faster than 
now. In other respects, the earlier report would maintain its status. Together 
with the complementary reports, it would thereby provide the foundations of 
the Finnish security and defence policy in the same manner as before. 
Another instrument is available in the form of a Prime Ministerial announcement, 
or that of a Minister designated by the Prime Minister, to Parliament on any 
topical issue referred to in section 45, subsection 2 of the Constitution. Such 
an announcement is submitted outside the order of the day of Parliament, 
at a time agreed with the Parliamentary Speaker (Parliament’s Rules of 
Procedure, section 24). Since Parliament takes no decisions on the basis of the 
announcement, this procedure is mainly suited to urgent cases. 
2.2 The President of the Republic and the Cabinet Committee  
 on Foreign and Security Policy
Pursuant to section 67 of the Constitution, the Government may establish 
Committees of Ministers for the preparation of various matters. In the State 
Practice (PeVM 1/1997 vp), Committees of Ministers have played an important 
role in preparedness issues and the co-ordination of functions in particular. 
Such a committee may not propose changes to the basic provisions of the 
Constitution or the Government Act concerning Committees of Ministers. Neither 
can it therefore propose changes to the mutual division of powers between the 
national leadership, the President of the Republic and the Government.
As concerns Committees of Ministers, in the above report the Committee has 
emphasised the status of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy. The provisions on the Committee’s remit are laid down in section 25, 
subsection 3 of the Government Rules of Procedure. However, the committee 
is of the opinion that the prerequisites for this Cabinet Committee’s handling 
of foreign and security policy issues require reinforcement. Taking cognisance 
of the comprehensive concept of security and occurrence of disruptions in 
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internal security, the committee proposes that section 25 of the Government 
Rules of Procedure be amended in such a manner that the Minister of the 
Interior becomes a member of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security 
Policy. At the moment, the Minister of the Interior only participates in the 
committee’s consideration of issues falling within his or her mandate.
In addition, with a view to co-ordinating the division of responsibilities at the 
highest level, attention should be paid to the importance of joint meetings 
between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and the 
President of Republic. Provisions on the possibility of joint meetings, which 
have become a regular practice, are laid down in section 24 of the Government 
Act.
So far, no detailed provisions have been deemed necessary on the procedures 
to be followed at the joint meeting of the President of the Republic and the 
Cabinet Committee. Such a joint meeting can be called by either the Prime 
Minister or the President (HE 270/2002 vp). It has been deemed important 
that the President is able to convene a joint meeting (UaVL 5/2010 vp). In this 
context, with reference to the view of the Parliamentary Constitutional Law 
Committee (PeVM 13/2002 vp), the committee points out that this Cabinet 
Committee is an important organ with respect to co-operation between the 
President and the Government, as referred to in section 93 of the Constitution. 
Similarly, during Parliamentary consideration of the Government bill on 
Amendment to the Constitution (HE 60/2010 vp), it was stated that the joint 
meeting between the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy and 
the President of Republic is a central forum for foreign policy co-operation 
(UaVL 5/2010 vp).
The committee also takes note of the fact that in the meetings between 
the President and the Cabinet Committee, urgent matters have rendered it 
practically impossible to focus on foreign and security policy issues from a 
broader perspective. Preparation of matters is concentrated in the hands of the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and this is still considered appropriate. However, 
the committee proposes that the preparatory process be supported in such a 
manner that the Security Committee presented below is also able to gather 
preparatory material on broader themes. 
Emphasising the importance of social debate and general access to information, 
the committee suggests that open seminar activities on various themes be 
organised by the Cabinet Committee on Foreign and Security Policy. The joint 
meeting of the President and Cabinet Committee could take the initiative in 
organising such a seminar. In addition to government parties, invitees might 
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include representatives of the opposition, the business sector and NGOs, as 
well as researchers from various fields. Such a mode of operating, whereby 
responsibility for practical preparation is concentrated in the hands of the 
Security Committee, would promote the adoption of a more comprehensive 
concept of security, while generating material for preparedness planning and 
the drafting of the relevant guideline documents. Similar seminar activity 
should also be arranged by the regional state administration, at regional level.
2.3 Strengthening the Prime Minister’s duty of co-ordination
Pursuant to section 66 of the Constitution, the Prime Minister directs the 
Government’s activities and oversees the preparation and consideration 
of matters falling within its mandate. Added to the Constitution to lay the 
foundations for further development of the Prime Minister’s status, this 
provision reflects recent development trends (HE 1/1998 vp). 
The committee takes note of the goal, set by the Constitutional Law Committee 
of Parliament, to develop lower-level legal provisions in such a manner that the 
Prime Minister can determine when an issue giving rise to a conflict of authority 
between ministries, or otherwise concerning Government activities, must be 
introduced in a plenary session, and upon a submission by which minister 
(PeVM 10/1998 vp). Accordingly, the Prime Minister’s status has already been 
adjusted in the Government Act (PeVM 13/2002/HE 270/2002 vp).
Pursuant to section 10 of the Government Act, upon a proposal by the Prime 
Minister, the Government resolves disagreements concerning the mandates 
of individual ministries in particular matters. In accordance with section 14 of 
the same Act, in individual cases matters requiring a decision by a ministry 
must be referred to a Government plenary session if considered sufficiently 
far-reaching or important as matters of principle. Referral decisions are taken 
by the plenary session, upon the proposal of the Prime Minister or the relevant 
minister. In addition, provisions on the Prime Minister’s duties in arranging a 
Government plenary session are laid down in section 22 of the Government 
Act. 
In section 1.3 above, the committee emphasises that the enactment of 
special statutes to address various abnormal conditions should be avoided. 
In conjunction with this, the committee underscores the powers vested in 
the Prime Minister by section 66 of the Constitution, and the provisions of the 
Government Act in other respects. 
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3 Development of the administrative structure  
of preparedness
3.1 From a Security and Defence Committee to a more  
 broad-based Security Committee
Established under the Ministry of Defence in 2000, the Security and Defence 
Committee is tasked, for example, with co-ordinating the preparation of matters 
falling within the scope of total national defence in various administrative 
sectors. This committee has a secretariat working under the Ministry of 
Defence.
The current Security and Defence Committee consists of the Secretary General 
of the Office of the President of the Republic, the Permanent Secretary of 
each ministry, the State Secretary of the Government Secretariat for EU 
Affairs, the Chief of Defence Command Finland, the Deputy Chief of Staff of 
Operations of Finnish Defence Forces, the Chief of the Finnish Border Guard, 
and the Chairman of the Council for Security of Supply and Infrastructure. 
Although, since its establishment, the Security and Defence Committee has 
been developing its operations into a more broad-based security organ, its 
current organisation and modes of operation fail to meet the requirements 
of a reformed administrative structure for preparedness, in accordance with 
the comprehensive concept of security and the mounting importance of the 
business sector and NGOs. 
The status of the Security and Defence Committee must therefore be 
strengthened by broadening its base and renaming it the Security Committee. 
Since this is a permanent organ, consideration could also be given to forms 
of organisation other than a committee structure. On the other hand, since 
the committee structure is well-established and the organ’s location under the 
Ministry of Defence has proven functional, no changes are necessary in this 
respect. The committee sees no need to establish a separate security council.
In order to expand the Security Committee’s organisational structure, it is 
proposed that, in addition to current members, at least two representatives 
of the financial and business world, and two representatives of key NGOs, be 
appointed to the committee. Furthermore, the National Police Commissioner 
and the Director General of Rescue Services should be appointed committee 
members. Following the organisation’s expansion, the committee’s remit would 
have a clearer focus on co-operation between the public and private sectors 
and issues relating to comprehensive security. The issues of organisation and 
chairmanship of the committee, as well as the term of office of members and 
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expanding duties must be resolved when amending the Government decree 
on the current committee.  
3.2 Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus on co-operation  
 within administration 
As a result of reorganisation of the duties and structure of the Security 
Committee, it will be easier for the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus, 
as a permanent Government co-operation organ, on co-operation between the 
ministries and co-ordinating the functions of various administrative branches. 
To enhance the co-ordination of various matters, when invited, the secretary 
general of the Office of the President of the Republic could participate in this 
organ’s activities. 
The committee also proposes that the Meeting of Permanent Secretaries 
maintain contact with the Security Committee. Since Permanent secretaries 
are members of the Security Committee, a natural opportunity for this exists. 
If matters serving the preparation of preparedness-related and foreign and 
security policy issues were concentrated with the Security Committee, the 
current duplication of functions would be eliminated. This would enable the 
Meeting of Permanent Secretaries to focus on its duties as the permanent 
Government co-operation organ.
3.3 Development of the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness  
 and the Meeting of Preparedness Secretaries
The committee is of the opinion that the mutual exchange of information 
and co-operation between the ministries’ permanent secretaries, heads of 
preparedness and secretaries of preparedness must be improved. Those 
responsible for preparedness issues must also enhance their collaboration 
with those of the ministry’s civil servants responsible for matters specific to 
the ministry, legislation and communication. In such issues, the key role will 
be played by the ministry’s preparedness committee, which should institute 
regular and planned activities within each ministry.
The meeting between the ministries’ heads of preparedness, on the other 
hand, is a central co-operation organ supporting the ministries in security 
matters. In turn, this meeting’s activities are supported and agenda items are 
prepared in meetings between secretaries of preparedness. These activities 
must be co-ordinated by the chairmen of the two meetings.
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In matters concerning preparedness, the Meeting of Heads of Preparedness 
must act in close co-operation with the Security Committee. If necessary, the 
chairman of the meeting will be invited to attend the meeting of the Security 
Committee as an expert.
In most cases of disruption, support provided by the meeting between 
the ministries’ heads of preparedness is sufficient to ensure control of the 
situation and crisis management capability. On the other hand, more far-
reaching disturbances and crises, especially those requiring extra resources, 
need co-operation at permanent secretary level. When the Meeting of Heads 
of Preparedness acts as a co-operation organ in crisis management, it is 
important that the chairman of the meeting engages in close co-operation with 
the chairman of the Security Committee and Security Secretariat. 
3.4 Establishment of Security Secretariat
The committee proposes that the preparation of security affairs be developed, 
by strengthening the status and operation conditions of the Security Secretariat, 
under the Security Committee. This can be effected by integrating existing 
structures. Crossing administrative boundaries, such a preparatory organ can 
be built upon current foundations, in order to encompass the Security and 
Defence Committee secretariat, and security experts from the Prime Minister’s 
Office, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior and other 
ministries.
The organisation and activities of the Secretariat can be developed in line with 
practical requirements. It is the duty of the Secretariat to provide support for 
preparedness measures, within various sectors of society in a variety of ways. 
The Security Secretariat operates under the Security Committee. Judicially, 
members of the Security Secretariat act as civil servants of the relevant 
ministry. Regulations concerning the Secretariat and the appointment of its 
secretary general will be included in the decree on the Security Committee.
3.6 Regional and municipal level
Each municipality will be responsible for preparedness and the range of duties 
over which it can exercise genuine control. At the moment, some municipalities 
have inadequate preparedness plans. It would therefore be important to 
promote co-operation between organisations such as municipalities, regional 
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state administrative agencies and rescue services. Preparedness at regional 
and municipal level should be further developed in such a way that rescue 
services and other organisations working across municipal boundaries play 
a distinct role. In municipal service production, there are also private service 
providers acting on a contractual basis. 
To enable the provision of support in cases of disruption, common practices 
must be created, according to which requests for support are transmitted 
to municipalities and the regional administration. A similar requirement for 
uniform practices concerns requests for executive assistance, or the provision 
of executive assistance for municipalities. As concerns municipal activities, the 
clearest arrangement would be to co-ordinate requests for support from the 
regional administration to municipalities via a single authority. On the other 
hand, support required by a municipality, from the regional administration 
within its own area, could be requested directly from the relevant regional state 
administrative agency, with the co-ordinating regional state administrative 
agency being notified of the matter. 
To enhance regional preparedness, regional preparedness committees, 
operating under the chief director of regional state administrative agencies, 
have been established, representing all key regional administration actors. 
During disruptions and emergency conditions, communication and the transfer 
of information between regional and local administrations must be ensured. In 
the event of disruptions in the mobile telephone network or other electronic 
communication systems, each municipality must have immediate access to the 
authorities’ radio network, VIRVE.
Practices related to maintaining situation awareness must be developed in 
collaboration with regional state administrative agencies. In the event of a 
disruption, it should be possible to make the joint situation awareness obtained 
at Government level available to municipalities. Respectively, it should also 
be possible to rapidly communicate municipal situation awareness acquired 
on the spot for general use. Furthermore, when developing preparedness 
at regional and municipal level, citizens must be able to identify where they 
belong at regional or local level. In addition, the participation of NGOs in 
preparedness activity, and the development of common situation awareness, 
must be secured. Procedures for the dissemination of information within the 
central and regional state administration must be developed in such a manner 
that the system also supports the situation awareness of municipalities and 
companies considered important with respect to functions vital to society. 
In conjunction with preparedness, the exchange and utilisation of situation 
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awareness information between systems must be ensured in the appropriate 
manner. Situation awareness arrangements should be created through co-
operative measures between the competent ministries, relevant authorities, 
municipalities and companies.
3.7 Enhancing the preparedness of citizens
Since tapping into society’s resources is of vital importance to preparedness 
activity and the management of disruption situations, special attention should 
be paid to close co-operation between authorities, the business sector, NGOs 
and citizens. The sense of collective responsibility can thereby be strengthened, 
which would help to promote voluntary activity as well as civic activity related 
to preparedness. Accordingly, the committee has taken note of organisations’ 
importance as part of comprehensive security at all administrative levels, for 
example when expanding the Security Committee’s organisation. 
In the event of a disruption, citizens may also have to act on their own initiative, 
without assistance from the authorities. With a view to crisis preparedness, 
citizens’ knowledge and capabilities, and their ability to act in the event of 
a crisis, are therefore essential from the viewpoint of individual citizens and 
society. Organisations play a central role in establishing such readiness: several 
(including the Finnish Red Cross, the National Defence Training Association 
of Finland, SPEK – The Finnish National Rescue Association, and Women’s 
National Emergency Preparedness Association) provide security training. 
The committee considers it important that attention be paid to securing the 
operational potential of such organisations and the quality and quantity of the 
security training provided to citizens.
Based on the experience of, for example, the contaminated water crisis in 
Nokia and the epidemic caused by the A(H1N1) virus, it is clear that crisis 
communications directed at citizens require development. From the viewpoint 
of both individual citizens and the community as a whole, communication 
plays a central role in the management of disruptions. Authorities must be 
capable of disseminating timely and reliable information on a continuous 
basis in any situation. This is important to maintaining the confidence 
of citizens and preventing the spread of unofficial, possibly misleading 
information. Development is also required with respect to co-operation on 
such communication between the authorities and various organisations. In 
particular, the possibility should be examined of utilising the resources and 
expertise of various organisations in extended disruption situations, where 
there is a greater need to keep citizens informed. 
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Efforts could be made to secure greater commitment to preparedness 
from organisations and communities that play a vital role with respect to 
comprehensive security. The committee notes the status and importance of 
the Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities as the co-operative 
organ of municipalities. In the above, the committee also points out that, in 
working life, the relevant occupational safety organisation in larger workplaces 
in particular could promote preparedness and access to accurate information. 
4 Development of steering of preparedness concerning 
several administrative sectors
4.1 Security Strategy for Society
The Government has taken a decision in principle on the Strategy to Secure 
the Functions Vital to Society in 2003, 2006 and 2010. In accordance with the 
Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, the strategy has been 
updated under the co-ordination of the Security and Defence Committee. 
Key adjustments included changing the threat scenarios to correspond to the 
continuously changing security environment, observation of the growing role 
of the business sector and NGOs in securing vital functions, and a review 
of the strategic tasks resting with each ministry. In an integrated manner, 
the strategy addressed the international dimension within each key strategy 
sector, rather than as a separate function. In addition, in the update of 2010, 
the name of the strategy was changed to the Security Strategy for Society. 
This better describes the strategy’s content, and is easier for both citizens and 
international co-operation partners to understand.
The committee is of the opinion that the Government’s decision-in-principle 
on the Security Strategy for Society complements the policies laid down in the 
Government reports, while providing uniform foundations for preparedness 
measures undertaken by ministries. All of these are steering measures related 
to the comprehensive security of society. The committee suggests that the 
strategy’s formulation continue to be assigned to the Security Committee. In 
this way, we can ensure that the strategy is reconciled with the Government 
resolution issued on security of supply targets and with the Internal Security 
Programme. The committee emphasises that, in order to ensure the practical 
implementation of strategy work, each ministry must provide strategy 
guidelines for its particular sector.
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4.2 Internal Security Programme
The Internal Security Programme is a Government decision-in-principle, issued 
twice so far, defining key targets and measures for internal security. The 
committee considers it important that guidelines concerning key targets and 
measures for internal security continue to be laid down at Government level. 
Furthermore, these guidelines should take note of the EU Internal Security 
Strategy and other EU measures.
In addition, the committee proposes that no concerted effort be made to expand 
the Internal Security Programme or Strategy into a social policy document, 
although many functions of various administration branches include an internal 
security dimension. It is also important that internal security guidelines be 
based on the broad-based Government Report on Security and Defence Policy, 
as well as being reconciled with the Security Strategy for Society and other 
relevant guideline documents.
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